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Private International Law
and Its Sources
Elliott E. Cheatham*
Harold G. Maier**
INTRODUCTION
Professors Cheatham and Maier raise the question, "What are the sources of
the law applied in private international cases?" The authors consider this question
under two main headings. The first deals with the "authoritative sources" of private
international law a applied in United Stat-es courts. It considers the question,
Where, within the complex governmental structure of the United States, does
power over private international matters rest?" Several possible sources are
considered:public internationallaw, state law, and federal law, and within federal
law, the major components: internationalagreements, legislation,federal common
law and executive law. The second part of the article deals briefly with the
"fundamental sources" of private international law. Here, the authors seek to
identify those basic policies which guide a law-making body in laying down and
developing principles of private internationallaw. In the process, they suggest a
numberof"threats" to the development of effective privateinternationalrules.

In economic and social matters the United States is a unit. Under
the protection of the Constitution, goods move freely and people drive or

fly across the continent almost without thought of state lines. In
government and law, however, the United States is diverse,' and the
diversities give rise to many problems. Analogously, increased speed
and ease of transportation have made trade and intercourse between
nations as easy as it was between the states a generation ago and easier

than it was between counties when the nation was founded.
Consequently, diversities in government and law among the nations
create problems in the international field parallel to those within the

United States. This article is concerned with some aspects of the
enlarging international relations, the sources of private international

law.
. Research Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law; LL.B., Harvard
University, 1911.
** Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law; J.D., University of
Cincinnati, 1963; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1964.
I. "[flhe United States. . .has perhaps the most complicated legal structure that has ever
been devised and made effective in man's effort to govern himself.. . . Only an American who has
grown up in the system, and come to think of it as a part of the order of nature, can fail to see how
intricate it is." E. GRISWOLD, LAW AND LAWYERS INTHE UNITED STATES 3, 64 (1964).
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"Source of law" is a term of many meanings. In this article, two
separate uses are employed in succession. The first part of the article
deals with the "authoritative sources" of private international law in the
United States. It is directed to the question: under our complex system of
government, which component has the power to formulate the rules of
law to be applied in private international law cases? In more specific
terms, to which of our political divisions must the citizen look for the
legal directives with which he must comply? In discussing possible
answers to these questions, the first part outlines the governmental and
legal complexities of our nation, placing special emphasis upon federal
common law and on federal executive law.
The second part of the article is concerned with the "fundamental
sources" of private international law; that is, the basic values existing
throughout the law of all nations which give direction and content to the
legal principles in this field, regardless of their authoritative sources. It is
these values, together with the practicalities involved in implementing
them, which are the "fundamental sources" of private international law.
A.

Diversitiesin Laws

As a federal nation the United States preserves the government and
laws of the fifty states. Their coordination with one another creates
many intranational problems of conflict of laws, and their coordination
with the laws of other nations gives rise to similar problems of private
international law.
Inherent in this federal structure is also the conflict between laws of
the component units and laws of the nation. In the United States the
conflict is between the laws of the states and the steadily widening federal
law which the supremacy clause of the Constitution makes "the law of
the land." Vertical conflicts is the helpful name given to such conflicts by
Professors von Mehren and Trautman in their fine casebook, The Laws
of InterstateRelations.
A third kind of conflict derives from the tripartite division of the
institutions of government. Under the federal and the state constitutions
the legislative, executive and judicial departments have their respective
fields of control. This separation of powers creates the additional
question: which department of government can make the law?
In the United States there is a further complexity not found in most
other federal nations-a separate set of federal courts which has its own
laws on procedural matters and which functions alongside the state
courts. To cap it all, there is the doctrine of judicial review, which gives
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the courts the last word on the problems of high politics which are
created by these complexities and cast in legal form.
The use of the term "conflict of law" to describe any of these legal
complexities within our federal system is misleading. There are diversities of legal rules, but there is no diversity of purpose between the states
and the national government or between the various law-makers functioning within the federal system of divided power. The common interest which all components of the system seek to advance is that of all the
people of the nation. Thus, the solution to the legal complexities
spawned by federalism is best thought of, not as a process of arbitration
between conflicting and jealous lawmakers, but rather as a process of
coordination of efforts to make the system work well and to provide
justice and security for all the nation's people.
In this process of coordination the particular complexity raised
for purposes of this article concerns the body of law to which American
courts and lawyers look to find authoritative guidance in an
international "conflict of laws" case. Thus, what is the commanding
source fbr choice of law rules in private international law matters in the
United States? It is not necessary for us to try to draw the imprecise and
blurred line between "public" and "private" international law.2 It is
enough to say that most international transactions and controversies are
between private individuals or corporations and come before the
ordinary municipal tribunals for decision according to some system of
law. It is essential to identify the law to be applied to them, and it is to
such ordinary international cases that this discussion is directed.
B.

AuthoritativeSources

The phrase, "authoritative sources," connotes bodies politic, the
organs of which exercise power in the development of controlling legal
principles. So the question of authoritative sources is put here in terms of
the several bodies of law which in the United States may control a
private international law matter.
The several sources can be illustrated by reviving the case of Hilton
v. Guyot . An action was brought by a French citizen against an
American citizen in a federal court in New York City on a judgment
which had been rendered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant
in a French court. In giving judgment for the American defendant on
2.

"Transnational law" is a comprehensive term proposed to cover the whole international

legal area. See-JEssup,
3.

TRANSNATIONAL LAW

159 U.S. 113 (1895).

(1956).
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appeal, a bare majority of the Supreme Court of the United States relied
on the principle of reciprocity. Finding that at this time France would
deny conclusiveness to an American judgment in a parallel case,' they
held that the French judgment should be denied conclusiveness here. If
the same case were brought today in the same court, what would be the
source of the law which would determine whether the principle of
reciprocity (the principle of "retorsion" as the minority in the Hilton
case stigmatized it) should be applied? Would it be the law of the State of
New York, since a federal court ordinarily must follow the conflict of
laws principles of the state in which it sits? Would it be federal law, that
is, the law of the United States which"could set the measure of protection
of a foreign nation's judgment in all courts throughout the nation?
Would it be federal courts' law, a special body of law on the subject
employed in the federal courts alone? Would it be international law, a
law applicable throughout the family of nations and supplanting the
municipal law of the United States?
Reverting to terms used earlier it will be observed that the situation
involves both a horizontal conflict of the laws of the nations, France and
the United States, and also a vertical conflict of the several bodies of law
of the United States or of the international order which may be used to
settle the horizontal conflict in a court in this country. It is the vertical
conflict with which we are concerned.
C.

The Structure of the Government

It is useful to take note of the structure of our government. There
are sharp differences between the first and second of our great state
papers, and the third. The Declaration of Independence declares that
"these United Colonies" are severally "Free and Independent States."
The Articles of Confederation continue the use of the term "States" in
the plural number as the source of the central government, and in
consonance with the plurality of creators, refers to the nation as "this
confederacy" and "a firm league of friendship." By contrast, in the first
words of the preamble the Constitution gives as the creators of the
nation, "We the People of the United States" who "do ordain and
establish this Constitution." So the United States of America is a federal
nation created by the people of the whole country, not a "confederacy"
or a "league" created by the agreement of the component states.
4. It appears that the doctrine or rule of reexamination on the merits has since been
abandoned in France. See Nadelmann, Recognition of Foreign Money Judgments in France,5 AI.
J. ComP. L. 248, 251 (1956). Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments:
One Down and More to Go, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 72 (1964).
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In an ideal federal nation it might seem obvious that the
coordination of the several laws inside the nation with the laws of other
nations should be governed by national law, not by the laws of the
component states. The component states of our Union have no
international voice and no international responsibility. If they or their
officials violate the standards of public international law, it is the nation,
the United States, which is called to account in the international arena.
The need that as to international relations this country be a nation in the
fullest sense-that is, the need for control by national law-was
perceived by the founders of our government. Numerous provisions of
the Constitution grant powers in these matters to the three branches of
the federal government, and other provisions deny power to the states
over specified matters.
As to hostile relations, Congress is given broad powers in the
prevention, initiation, and conduct of war. In providing for the common
defense it may raise armies and navies, declare war, and grant letters of
marque and reprisal. The s tates are denied power in this field. In
amicable foreign relations, too, the national government has wide
powers. The Congress can regulate foreign commerce; the President with
the consent of the Senate can make treaties and appoint diplomatic
representatives; and the federal courts have jurisdiction over typically
foreign controversies, such as cases in admiralty and controversies
between local citizens and foreigners. Again, the States are denied power
over foreign relations, and they may not enter into any treaty or compact
with a foreign power without the consent of Congress. In protecting and
policing international intercourse, Congress is given power to define and
punish piracy and felonies on the high seas and other offenses against the
law of nations.
The structure of our government, nevertheless, is one of delegation
of some powers to the nation by the people through the Constitution, with
all other powers reserved to the states or to the people. The tenth amendment makes this explicit:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or the people.

Under this structure where does power over private international law
rest? The terms of the Constitution, with its division of power between
the nation and the states, are of basic importance. Yet the Constitution
must not be considered merely with the dictionary in hand. It is essential
to keep in mind the values of reserving local self-government to the
states. It is no less essential to give attention to the needs of the nation
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and of the international order in matters of national and international
concern, with which the national government and its agencies can deal
most effectively. Especially is it so in these days when peaceable
international relations are vastly easier and speedier than interstate
relations were but a few years ago, and when hostile international
relations include the power of mutual destruction.
Our particular question is made sharper by the following classification
of legal problems arising out of the difference and variety of
governmental and legal units:
I. Interstate Relations within the United States.
A. Public interstate law
B. Private interstate law
II. International Relations.
A. Public international law
B. Private international law
Public interstate law is federal law. "Controversies between two or
more States" are subject to adjudication by the Supreme Court of the
United States, and the law applied in settling the controversies, as over
such matters as state boundaries and the division of the waters of
interstate rivers, is federal law. In reversing a decision which applied
state law, Justice Brandeis was explicit: "For whether the water of an
interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a
question of federal common law upon which neither the statutes nor the
decisions of either State can be conclusive." 5 The states may settle
controversies between themselves by agreement but any such
"Agreement or Compact" is subject to the consent of Congress.
Private interstate law is, in part, subject to the directions or
limitations of federal law, as illustrated by the full faith and credit clause
and the due process clause of the Constitution. In its largest part,
however, private interstate law is state law.
Public international law is not subject to the control of the federal
government, much less that of the states. For example, several
controversies which in their private aspect had been decided with finality
by the Supreme Court for purposes of municipal law were later taken
before international tribunals on the ground that public international
law had been violated. In about half of these cases the decision of the
international tribunal was against the United States. The nature of
public international law and its relation to municipal law are considered
below, and the questions will not be anticipated here.
. 5.

Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938),

INTERNATIONAL LAW
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The several possible authoritative sources of private international
law will be considered in this order: public international law, state law,
and federal law. Under federal law the several major components are: the
Constitution; international agreements; legislative law (statutes and joint
resolutions); judge-made law, with federal common law distinguished
from federal courts' law; and executive law. Finally, the more basic
matters, the fundamental sources of the principles of private
international law, no matter what may be the formal or authoritative
sourrces in this country, will be treated.

I.

THE AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES

A.

Public InternationalLaw

Since the beginning of our republic it has been said that public
international law is part of the law of the United States.' The Law of
Nations was familiar to the framers of the Constitution and knowledge
of it formed an important part of their legal and philosophical attitudes.
These international legal principles played an important role in
influencing the structure of our government and in shaping the thinking
of the .men who were to lead it.7 But, is public international law an
authoritative source of private international law rules in the United
States? To answer this question it is important to distinguish sharply the
role of public international law as an authoritative source which compels
the result in a private legal dispute before a municipal tribunal and public
international law as a body of legal principles which are considered and
drawn upon in formulating the rules of municipal law operative in
domestic judicial decisions. The commingling of these two different
concepts, the law of the nation and the law of nations, occurs in many
books on "international law." Such a commingling is understandable,
since both bodies of law are important for the international practitioner.'
An illustration of their combined importance is the Restatement
6. See, e.g., Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. (I Dall.) 111, 116 (1784). The traditional
citation for this proposition is found in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
7. For a thorough and sensitive analysis of the influence of the "Law of Nations" on the
framers of the Constitution, see Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the NationalLaw of the
United States. 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1952).
8. A casebook which sought throughout to keep the difference clear is DICKINSON, CASES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1950). It divides most of its chapters into two parts, headed respectively,
"The International Forum" and "The National Forum." More recently, the excellent casebook
STEINER & VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (1968) is almost entirely devoted to
distinguishing these two systems and to demonstrating their interaction.
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(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States9 which,

while dealing with both, at several places makes explicit the difference.
This part of our discussion begins by demonstrating that public
international law is not an authoritative source of private international
law rules in United States courts.'" It then considers briefly the extent to
which public international law principles do nevertheless exert a strong
effect upon the outcome of private international cases.
Courts in the United States do not treat public international law as
controlling in private international cases. Neither the customary "Law
of Nations," nor the more explicit international agreements are treated
as binding, except to the extent that their positive norms have been included as part of national law by executive, legislative or judicial action.
The law applied in "purely private" international law cases-those involving choice of law, recognition of foreign judgments, the "international" law merchant, and law maritime-has, since the earliest days of
the nation, been subject to variation based upon domestic interests and
domestic power. International principles of comity and territorial sovereignty have been relevant but not controlling. A comparative examination of national rules does not reveal a measure of uniformity among
national laws to permit the identification of a "general principle of law"
sufficiently recognized to achieve the status of a public international
rule." Even if such a rule could be identified, American courts would not
treat it as binding. Justice Holmes, writing in a maritime case, stated this
position forcefully:
There is no mystic over-law to which even the United States must bow. When a case
is said to be governed by foreign law or by general maritime law that is only a short
way of saying that for this purpose the sovereign power takes up a rule suggested
from without and makes it part ofits own rules. . . . [F]rom the necessary point of
view of the sovereign ard its organs whatever is enforced by it as law is enforced as
the expression of its will."2

The decline of the vested rights theory in private international cases, as
well as in purely domestic ones, helps to make it even clearer that there is
9. See, e.g., §§ 2, 63, 151 (1965).
10. A different situation pertains, of course, in international tribunals. There, the norms of
private international law dealing with judicial jurisdiction and primary choice of law have public
international law as their authoritative source. See Stevenson, The Relationship of Private
InternationalLaw to PublicInternationalLaw, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 561, 567-74 (1952).
11. Id. at 577-78.
12. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1922); Compare the view of the future of
international law in municipal courts expressed in 1939 by the late Sir Hersch Lauterpaeht: "The
final development, when it comes to pass, will prescribe for municipal courts the supremacy of the
law of nations over the law of the land-a consumation which will go much beyond the doctrine of
adoption as now operative ..
" Quoted in Feinberg, Hersch Lauterpacht-Juristand Thinker, 3
ISRAEL L. REV. 333, 335 (1968).
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no external compulsion of international custom upon United States
courts to enforce foreign-created rights or to give judicial recognition to
established principles of general international private law where
domestic rules are in conflict. 3
Treaties to which the United States is a party clearly serve as an
authoritative source of private international law, 4 but this is so because
they are effective as national law. The authoritative nature of treaty law
derives not from its status as a binding international legal obligation, but
from its existence as national "legislation" under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution. Consequently, Congress may limit or abolish the
internal effect of a treaty by means of the normal legislative process."3 It
may refuse to implement non-self-executing treaties even though an
international obligation to do so clearly exists.' 6 In any conflict between
the Constitution and an international agreement, the Constitution is
authoritative for domestic purposes. 7
One area in which public international law might be treated as
authoritative in private matters concerns the activities of multinational
corporations. These corporations engage in activities crossing several
national boundaries. They influence and, in some instances, control, the
economies of many countries and their legal problems raise complex
transnational questions not necessarily amenable to adequate .solution
under the laws of a particular nation. s The managers of such a
corporation give close attention to many international considerations,
including those which are economic, social, political and legal in
character.1 9 The corporation may have agreements, too, with its peers or
with its subordinates in different countries under which controversies are
dealt with by special arbitration tribunals and are kept out of national
courts. 0 George W. Ball has suggested the recognition of an
13. See Nussbaum, Rise and Declineof the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws,
42 COLUM. L. REv. 189, 206 (1942).
14. See text accompanying notes 63-113 infra.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 145 (1965), citingThe Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
16. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1964) 468-69 (N. Small & L. Jayson ed.
1964).
17. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
18. See Ball, The Promiseof the MultinationalCorporation, FORTUNE 80 (June I, 1967). An
interesting discussion of some of these legal problems is found in Miller, The Corporation as a
PrivateGovernment in the World Community, 46 VA. L. REV. 1539 (1960).
19. See Rose, The Rewarding Struggles of Multinationalism, FORTUNE 100 (Sept. 15, 1968);
Rolfe, UpdatingAdam Smith, INTERPLAY 15 (Nov., 1968).
20. See LaLive, Contracts Between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign Company, 13
1 r'L &Comp. L.Q. 987 (1964).
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"international companies law" as a means of avoiding "the stifling
restrictions imposed on commerce by the archaic limits of nation
states.1 2' But multinational corporations are not yet governed by a
supranational law, corresponding to .the law merchant or the law of
admiralty in earlier days. Such a corporation must still look to the law
of a particular nation for its creation and its activities are subject to
national laws. In the future, there may be methods under which such a
corporation can be created by an international agency, even as
specialized instrumentalities are created by the United Nations and are
recognized by national courts. 2 Or the corporation may be chartered by
several States.23 But that is for the kind of future to which we all look.
If international law were to be treated as authoritative in any
matters involving private parties before American courts it would appear
to be most natural in cases concerning the person or acts of a foreign
sovereign or his representative. 4 But the three branches of the federal
government, together, have made it clear that rules pertaining to both
sovereign immunity and the internal effect to be given to acts of a foreign
state find their authority in national, not international law. Since 1943,
the Supreme Court has' repeatedly held that questions of sovereign
immunity are to be dealt with in the light of national law and policy, not
under international legal principles derived from the custom of nations.
Absolute deference is given to State Department suggestions that
immunity be granted or denied. 5 Where the State Department has taken
no position, judicial determinations find their authority in federal
common law, developed against a background of principles contained in
State Departrrnt suggestions and the general statement of policy
contained in the Tate Letter of 1952.26 Earlier cases which impliedly

treated international law as authoritative have been reinterpreted as
21. TME 95 (Nov. 24, 1967).
22. See, e.g., Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Development Bank, 382 F.2d
454 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Vigoureux v. Comite des Obligataires Danube-Save-Adriatique, Tribunal Civil de laSeine (1951), INT'L L. REP. I, 41 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 463 (1952) (reprinted in translation in KATZ & BREWSTER, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 297 (1960).
23. See Foley, Incorporation.Multiple Incorporationand the Conflict oJ Laws, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 516 (1929). Proposals for international multi-state chartering on a regional basis have been
under consideration in the European Economic Community for some time. See Thompson, The
Project fora ConmtercialCompany of European Type, 10 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 851 (1961).
24. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 578-85.
25. These developments are examined in more detail in the subsection on "Political
Questions" infra.
26. Letter from Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to Dep't of Justice, May 19, 1952, in 26
DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
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expressions of controlling national policy.2 7 In a case allowing a
counterclaim filed by a private domestic defendant against a foreign
sovereign plaintiff, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
The freedom of a foreign sovereign from being haled into court as a defendant...
has since become a part of the fabric of our law. It has become such solely through
adjudications of this Court .
-..
It rests on considerations of policy given legal
sanction by this Court.s

The clearest rejection of public international law as authoritative in
American domestic courts is found in the litigation culminating in the
Supreme Court's decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino29
and in the subsequent legislation responsive to it.3" The case turned upon
the effect to be given to the confiscation in Cuba of a shipment of sugar
belonging to American citizens when the proceeds from the sale of that
sugar were brought to the United States and were claimed both by its
former owners and the Cuban government. The Supreme Court rejected
the opinion of the two lower courts which held that the normal rule
prohibiting judicial examination of the act of a foreign state done within
its own borders was inapplicable when that act violates international
law.3 The Court recognized the relevance of international norms for the
final solution of the litigation, but emphatically rejected public
international law as an authoritative source for either the act-of-state
doctrine or for the substantive law to be applied in the United States
courts to determine the validity of the expropriation:
Although it is, of course, true that United States courts apply international law as a
part of our own in appropriate circumstances, [cases cited] the public law of nations
can hardly dictate to a country which is in theory wronged how to treat that wrong

within its domestic borders."

The Court reasoned that the lack of clarity in international legal
standards concerning expropriation would make any attempt to apply
them by a municipal forum inappropriate in view of the difficulty which
such a determination might raise for the executive branch in its conduct
of foreign relations. Lack of clarity in the law, however, is no reason for
refusal to adjudicate a case where that body of law is authoritative. The
authority here was clearly national, not international, in nature. Aware
27. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945).
28. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358-59 (1955).
29. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
30. Foreign Assistance Act § 301(d)(4), ch.I, pt. 11, 78 Stat. 1013, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2) (Supp. 1 1965).
31. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afj'd, 307
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
32. 376 U.S. at423 (1964).
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of this, the Court took care to point out that although there might in fact
be an ascertainable international norm, it was not required to apply it."
The Sabbatino decision raised a furor of criticism, much of it based
upon the Court's failure to treat international law as authoritative in
deciding the principal substantive issue, or at least to apply its principles
as part of municipal law. This reaction resulted in an amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962-variously called the Sabbatino, the
Hickenlooper, or the "Rule of Law" Amendment-requiring both state
and federal courts to adjudicate cases involving foreign confiscations
under "principles of international law" when an international legal
violation was alleged. 4 But the amendment did not direct the courts to
examine public international law sources to find authority for its
decisions. Rather, it incorporated by reference a definition of
international law applicable to foreign property seizures which included
a requirement of "speedy compensation . . . in convertible foreign
exchange, equivalent to the value thereof,"" thus legislatively
predetermining the very point on which the international controversy
concerning the requirement of compensation turns. 6
After a remand of the Sabbatino case in which the district court
applied the amendment to the pending litigation," the Second Circuit
affirmed on appeal." In the opinion, however, the appellate court raised,
but did not answer, the question "whether Congress can thus specify how
our United States courts must decide questions of international law
.
. ."" This question by the court is not accurately formulated. The
legislative history of the amendment makes it clear that Congress did
intend to make its own view of international law authoritative.4" The
33. Id. at 428-32 n.26.
34. See note 30, supra.
35. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1964).
36. See, e.g., Exchange of Correspondence between the Secretary of State of the United
States and the Foreign Minister of Mexico, 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 65561(1942).
37. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y.) (the receiver Sabbatino
had been removed from the litigation, 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (mem.), affd, 383 F.2d
166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
38. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956
(1968).
39. 383 F.2d at 185.
40. See generally Hearings on S. 1367 Before the Senate Comn. on Foreign Relations on the
Foreign Assistance Act, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Hearings on H.R. 7750 Before the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs on the Foreign AssistanceAct, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1965); Letter from
Senator Hickenlooper to the Washington Post, July 27, 1964, in 110 CONG. REc. 19546 (1964). At
least as much, if not more, emphasis is given in these documents to the supposed beneficial effects of
the amendment as a means of discouraging expropriation of American-owned property by foreign.
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question is not whether Congress may specify international legal
standards, but rather, whether Congress may establish a legislatively
decreed policy for this nation which shall be applied regardless of its
possible conflict with existing standards of international law. The answer
is clear that it may. This settled proposition was recognized by Judge
Bryan in an early case under the Sabbatino Amendment:
The legislative history of the Hickenlooper Amendment and its extensions is replete
with statements reaffirming what is plain on the face of the legislation, i.e. that
international law, at least from the parochialpoint of view of the United States,
requires full compensation for seizures of American-owned property. . . . This
court would accordingly be bound to apply the provisions of the Hickenlooper
Amendment even if they were found to be inconsistent with the views of other
41
nations on international law, though that is not so here.

Thus, for our purposes, it may be concluded that public
international law, to the extent that it represents a body of positive
norms intended to control the conduct of the international community,
is not an authoritative source of law in private international cases. It
may be, and often is, rejected, even in those cases in which it would seem
to be most appropriately applied.
To say that public international law is not "authoritative" in private international cases is not to say that it is irrelevant. The principles
and values represented by the rules of public international law are among
the most powerful of the "fundamental sources" of law with which the
second part of this paper will deal. Additionally, the international legal
system, representing as it does the values and "felt needs" of the community of nations, does exert a strong, though informal, influence over
the content of private international law rules in the United States courts.
An early judicial recognition of this influence is found in the statement
of Justice Marshall in The Charming Betsy: "[A]n Act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains ...
. This maxim which has been
restated again and again to the present day, represents a positive
nations as to the desirability of increasing recognition of international legal principles in United
States courts. The goal of protecting American investors could hardly have any chance of
achievement unless the principles of compensation "recommended" by Congress were adopted by
American courts. It appears to be somewhat unrealistic to assume that the adoption of the
amendment was not due, in large part, to the assumption by the members of Congress that the
statute required a judicial finding of an "international law" violation if "speedy compensation" had
not been paid to the American property owner. Compare Bleicher, The Sabbatino Aniendnent in
Court: Bitter Fruit, 20 STAN. L. REV. 858 (1968).
41. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (emphasis added).
42. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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influence of international law on the outcome of private international
law cases.
There are many modern instances illustrating the influence of
international considerations in private cases. The Supreme Court in
Hilton v. Guyot refused to enforce a foreign judgment upon the grounds
that "the rule of reciprocity has worked itself firmly into the structure of
international jurisprudence."43 In Lauritzen v. Larsen the Court rejected
a literal application of the Jones Act to a maritime tort on board a
Danish ship in New York harbor in favor of general principles of
maritime jurisprudence based, as it said, upon international law. The
limiting effect of international considerations was paramount in the
Court's reasoning:
[l]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the
necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should we
forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law to
a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to
apply its law to an American transaction."

In cases involving extra-territorial application of American antitrust
laws, American courts have had to consider the effect of decisions and
decrees to avoid conflict with international jurisdictional requirements
which might result in infringement upon the sovereignty of a foreign
nation.45 In at least one case, a proposed decree was revised after
complaint by a foreign government concerning its effect upon a
46
company which was its national.
International legal concepts also affect the domestic interpretation
and implementation of international agreements. It is a maxim of treaty
interpretation that an act of Congress apparently in conflict with a treaty
will be interpreted, whenever possible, so as to avoid the violation of an
international legal obligation. 7 For the same reason, American courts
43. 159 U.S. 113, 227 (1895).
44. 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
45. See, e.g.. United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215, 220-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). The success of Judge Ryan's "diplomacy" in that case which ordered the
conveyance of certain British patents owned by ICI may be measured by the comment of Sir
Raymond Evershed when the validity of the order was questioned in a British court. "If. . . the
learned judge intended to say (as it seems to me that he did) that it was not an intrusion on the
authority of a foreign sovereign to make directions addressed to that foreign sovereign, or to its
courts, or to nationals of that foreign power, effective to remove (as he says) 'harmful effects on the
trade of the United States,' I am bound to say that, as at present advised, I find myself unable to
agree with it." British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R.
780, 782; [1952] 2 T.L.R. 669, 671.
46. United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953). The Dutch note
protesting the original decree is reproduced in EBB, INTERNATIONAL BusINESS 571-73 (1964).
47.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 145, Comment (b) (1965).
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give "great weight" to executive advice concerning the nature of the
international obligations which a treaty imposes." The nature of
sovereignty as an international legal concept together with the rights and
duties owed by one sovereign to another have been the keystone of
federal common law and federal executive law relating to sovereign and
diplomatic immunity and the act of state doctrine.49 International legal
concepts concerning the rights and duties of states were at the heart of
Justice Sutherland's analysis in the Curtiss-Wright case 0 of executive
and national power over foreign affairs. A most convincing evidence of
the influence of public international law within the United States is the
fact that both the Office of the Legal Advisor to the Department of State
and the Office of the Attorney General regularly render opinions to the
executive branch concerning United States international legal
obligations."
But private international cases may not be decided without
reference to the standards of conduct prevalent in the world community.
To the extent that these standards operate as practical limitations upon
the freedom oftcourts and upon the legislative and the executive
branches in decidilig disputes involving transnational matters, public
international legal norms have a great and often decisive effect in
American jurisprudence. The means by which this influence is exerted
are described by Professor Myers McDougal in his essay, The Impact
of International Law Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective:
The influence of inclusively prescribed policies depends not so much upon internal
arrangements as upon the impact of external variables in the world power
process-including potential reciprocities and threatened retaliations-which drive
a decision maker toward conformity or nonconformity. . . The insistent
pressures of the world power process impose certain sources and content of

authority, sustained by effective sanctions upon internal decision-makers if2they are
to maximize the values of the national community with which they identify.-

B. State Law
Under the structure of the government of the United States the
states are the residuary keepers of all governmental powers not delegated
48.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §

152 (1965).

49. See text beginning at note 226 infra.
50. United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See text
accompanying note 174 infra.
51. For an extensive discussion of the duties of the Attorney General in this regard, see
DEENER, THE UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

52.

McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

209 (1960).

(1957).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

['VoL. 22

to the nation or prohibited to the states. So the control over private
international law remains in the states unless it is vested in the nation,
subject to whatever limitations on the states may be imposed under the
Constitution or international law.
There are more positive grounds than mere governmental structure
for the conclusion that state law is ordinarily the controlling law. The
states have long applied their conflict of laws rules to international cases
without hindrance or question. In the current remaking of conflict of
laws principles two of the leading cases are state cases involving
international issues. The opinions reflected the international character of
the decisions, but gave no intimation that this factor affected the
authoritative sources of the result. 3 The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, assuming that state law
governs the enforcement of the judgments of the tribunals of foreign
nations, drafted a uniform law on the subject and recommended it to the
states for adoption.14 Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code, now
adopted in forty-nine of the fifty states, has a choice of law provision
which is identical in terms for interstate and international cases." The
treatises on conflict of laws for the most part do not discuss the problem
and apparently assume that ordinarily the state courts will fashion and
apply conflict of laws rules for interstate, and international cases as
well. 6

What is even more important than silence or assumption is the
admirable attitude of the state courts in these matters, free as they are of
parochialism or nationalism. Three instances illustrate the concern of
the state courts for achieving fairness in international cases equal to that
sought in interstate cases. In 1952 the Supreme Court of California
struck down a provision of the California Alien Land Law on the ground
it was in violation of the United States Constitution. 7 In another case a
district court of appeals of the same state had before it a question of the
distribution of the personal estate of a local domiciliary of foreign
53. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Auten v.
Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
54. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, approved by the National
Coriference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1962.
9B UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 64 (1966).
55. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105.
56. Professor Albert Ehrenzweig would distinguish international conflict of laws sharply
from intranational conflicts. See EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1962);
EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967). A helpful recent discussion of the question in
the issue of a law review dedicated to Professor Ehrenzweig is Scoles, Interstate and International
Distinctionsin Conflict of Laws in the UnitedStates,54 CALIF. L. REV. 1599 (1966).
57. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).

1968]

INTERNATIONAL LA W

nationality. The decedent left surviving him in his native country two
polygamous wives, both lawful there. The court recognized the
polygamous marriages as valid in this country for the purpose in
question, and the two wives were awarded equal shares of the estate." In
New York the highest court explicitly refused to apply the reciprocity
principle laid down in the Hilton case and enforced a Quebec judgment,
even though the Province of Quebec would not have enforced a New
York judgment. 9 As a study a generation ago showed, the state courts
have transferred the principles developed in interstate cases to private
international law cases:
[1]n a world of nationalism and tariff barriers, there is fforded the inspiring
spectacle of foreign countries being granted all the privileges of sister states in a
branch of law that has grown up with the relations of confederated states in view. 0

C. FederalLaw
Article VI of the Constitution lists as "the supreme Law of the
Land" three kinds of national law: "[1] This Constitution, [2] the Law of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and [3] all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States." The second category listed above, "the Law of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof," is more
comprehensive than may appear at first glance. The Constitution creates
three branches of government. Under the document and according to the
principle of separation of powers, each branch possesses the inherent
powers appropriate to it. So articles I, II, and III begin with language
vesting in the several branches respectively a full measure of national
power: article I, "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States;" article II,"The executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States;" article 11I, "The judicial
Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
58. In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948).
59. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
Professor Reese has shown that American courts generally do enforce judgments rendered in other
countries. See Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 783 (1950). A recent article on the recognition of the adjudications by foreign nations'

tribunals suggests that the favorable attitude of American courts has as a basis the policy of
"fostering the elements of stability and unity essential in an international order in which many
aspects of life are not confined to any single jurisdiction," but that the "international recognition
practice need not be a simple echo of a federal system's treatment of sister state judgments." von
Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications:A Survey andaSuggested Approach,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1604, 1607 (1968).

60. Du Bois, The Significancein Conflict of Laws of the Distinction between Interstate and
InternationalTransactions, 17 MINN. L. REV. 361, 380 (1932).
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such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." Since each of the three branches of government may make
national law, it is necessary to consider their respective law-making
powers separately. The three kinds of national laws expressly mentioned
in the supremacy clause-the Constitution, treaties, and federal
statutes-will be treated first. Then three others which are implicit in the
Constitution will be considered-federal courts' law, federal common
law, and federal executive law.
1. The Constitutionof the United States.-The Constitution has a
double aspect. Since it is the foundation document of our government, in
,a sense every question concerning the extent of governmental powers
goes back to it for answer. In another aspect it contains a variety of
enabling and restrictive provisions. The latter aspect is of particular
concern here.
Numerous provisions of the Constitution, as pointed out above,
give to the central government wide powers over relations with foreign
nations. Some explicit provisions, as the full faith and credit clause and
the privileges and immunities clause, deal with phases of intranational
conflicts only. Yet the broad guarantees of fairness through the due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses extend to
aliens, in private international law cases, as well as to aliens within the
country.' For example, a gross mistake in the choice of the applicable
law in an international case may be upset under the due process clause."
Yet it is unlikely that the Constitution will now be invoked as a basis of
federal control over private international law matters generally.
2. InternationalAgreements.-In its external affairs, the nation is
a unit "vested with all the powers of government necessary to maintain
an effective control of international relations."63 Thus, the government is
unitary, not federal, in its foreign relations powers. A necessary
concomitant of this plenary national power in external affairs is the
power to carry out those international duties which the national
government may accept-to enforce within its territory those obligations
which it has undertaken by the exercise of its inherent external power."
Consequently, the supremacy clause of the Constitution unequivocally
61.

"Finally, it is urged that the Federal Constitution does not require the States to recognize

and protect rights derived from the laws of foreign countries-that as to them the full faith and
credit clause has no application. . . . They rest upon the Fourteenth Amendment. Its protection
extends to aliens." Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397,410-1I (1930) (Brandeis, J.).
62. Id.

63.

Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933).

64.

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 112-14 (2 Bourneed. 1901) (Hamilton).
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makes treaties, entered into under the authority of the United States or
federal legislation passed to implement them, the authoritative source of

law for the matters with which they deal. Equally, under the general
foreign affairs powers, validly concluded international agreements

between the executive branch of government and foreign nations have the
force of supreme national law.
The first proposition was settled in 1796 in Ware v. Hylton when the

Supreme Court, with sweeping language, struck down an otherwise valid
state statute which had cancelled debts owed by Virginians to British

nationals during the Revolution, because it conflicted with the provisions of the Jay Treaty of 1783. The Court wrote:
A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is, of all the United States, if
any act of a state legislature can stand in its way. . . . It is the declared will of the
people of the United States that every treaty made, by the authority of the United
States, shall be superior to the Constitution and laws of any individual state; and
their will alone is to decide."

By contrast, the authoritative status of executive agreements was not
finally sttled until 1936 in Belmont v. United Statds. Upholding the

validity of the Litvinov Assignment as part of the executive agreement in
which the United States recognized the Soviet government, the Supreme

Court ruled that the United States had the right to claim a deposit in a
New York bank belonging to a Russian corporation which had been
nationalized by the Soviets following the Russian Revolution. The Court

refused even to consider whether the public policy of New York
prohibited the recognition in that state of the validity of the Soviet

seizure. After emphatically upholding the executive's power to enter such
agreements without the advice and consent of the Senate, the Court

stated:
Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard
to state laws or policies. . . . And while this rule in respect of treaties is established
by the express language of cl. 2, art. VI, of the Constitution, the same rule would
result in the case of all international compacts and agreements from the very fact
that complete power over international affairs is in the national government and is
not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the
several states. . . . In respect of all our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York does not exist.""

The principal controversy concerning the treaty power has not

arisen in connection with the effect of valid international agreements as
binding internal law, but rather, in connection with its scope. For the
purposes of the present article, this question can be stated: To what
65. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796).
66. 301 U.S. 324,331 (1936).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

['VOL. 22

extent may international agreements be used to create private

international law within the United States?
The Constitution is intentionally not explicit concerning the scope

of the treaty power. 67 But implicit in the creation of a new nation was the
intent to create an entity whose right and power in international relations
was "equal to the right and power of the other members of the
international family" under principles of international law. 68 The mere

creation of an international entity does not automatically make it
similar in international matters to all other nations in the world
community.69 But the federal nature of the United States is not, in itself,
a limitation upon the power of its national government to affect internal
legal changes by treaty in order to carry out the requirements of its
external affairs.
The landmark case of Missouri v. Holland" settled this question. In

that case, the validity of an act of Congress implementing a treaty with
Great Britain for the protection of birds migrating between the United
States and Canada depended upon the validity of the treaty as a proper

exercise of national authority. Recognizing that prior lower court cases
had held a similar statute not connected with a treaty to be unconstitutional as beyond the scope of federal authority,7 Justice Holmes nonetheless found the subject matter clearly within the scope of the federal

treaty-making power:
67. One explanation was given by Madison: "The object of treaties is the regulation of
intercourse with foreign nations and is external. I do not think it possible to enumerate all the cases
in which such external regulations would be necessary. . . . The definition might and probably
would be defective. . . . It is most safe, therefore, to leave it to be exercised so contingencies may
arise." 3 ELLIOTS DEBATES 514 (2d ed. 1836-66).
68. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
69. "With respect to the outer limits of the treaty power, the extent of the treaty power of the
United States would be the same as that of another nation only if that other nation had within its
constitution precisely the same limitations on its government as those contained in the Constitution
of the United States. . . . This is not to say that, overall, the treaty power of the United States is
less extensive than that of other nations; in some respects it is more extensive, It is merely to say
that as the subjects of treaties vary, the power of the United States validly to enter into them varies,
and that this peculiar juxtaposition of subject and power is not exactly matched by any other
nation." E. BYRD, JR., TREATIES AND ExEcUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 126
(1960) (footnotes omitted).
70. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
71. Holmes cited United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914) and United States v.
McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915). Professor Louis Henkin points out that Holmes might have
felt it necessary to rest the opinion on the treaty power because a majority of the Court would not
have accepted a broadening interpretation of the commerce clause. Today, congressional regulation
of migrating birds would clearly be permitted by the commerce clause alone without the additional
factor of an international treaty. See Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of
the Landand Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903,914 n.24 (1959).
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It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national wellbeing that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such
an act could. . . .The only question is whether it [the treaty] is forbidden by some
invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. . . .No doubt
the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a
treaty may override its power. . . .Here a national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with
that of another power. . . It is not sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance
is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the UnitedStates is forbidden
to act. 2

The power of the national government to enter into international
agreements is coextensive with the foreign affairs interests of the United

States. The most thorough definition of its nature is found in Geofroy v.
Riggs:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by
those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the
government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the
government itself and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends
so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of
the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the
territory without its consent. . . .But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that
there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which
is properly the subject ofnegotiationswith aforeign country.7

Nearly forty years later, Chief Justice Hughes put it most sharply in a
dispute between the state of New York and the government of Italy

concerning the right to take by escheat the estate of a resident alien:
"The treaty-making power is broad enough to cover all subjects that
properly pertain to our foreign relations . . . and any conflicting law of

the State must yield."

74

These definitions, in addition to the specific limitations imposed by

the existence of constitutionally-created rights, contain an implicit
limitation as well-any matter which does not properly pertain to our

foreign relations is not a proper subject for the treaty-making power.
More directly stated: Wholly domestic matters are not subject to

regulation by international agreement. But this form of distinction
between "foreign interests" and "domestic matters" is not in itself
particularly helpful in determining the scope of the treaty power. As one

writer puts it:
[W]ords at the level of abstraction of "international concern" and "domestic
jurisdiction" are more labels for describing the consequences of decision than
explanatory factors accounting for decision, and . . .guch words do not refer to
72. 252 U.S. at 433-35 (emphasis added).
73. 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (emphasis added).
74. Santovicenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30,40 (1931).
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"irreducible spheres of rights" or to "impenetrable barriers" precluding a moving
and variable line between inclusive and exclusive competence."

Most treaties which affect internal private-law relationships have
been so clearly concerned with traditional foreign relations that modern
courts and commentators usually assume without discussion that they
represent a legitimate exercise of the treaty power; yet they have a
profound impact upon domestic law. By far the largest category of

private law treaties are those affecting personal and property rights of
alien individuals or corporations. 76 These treaties have created national

law which overrides otherwise applicable state law in matters concerning
validity of debts due to foreigners," title to land,7" escheat and

inheritance,79 statutes of limitations," local taxation,"1 administration of
alien estates,82 prohibitions against employment of foreign labor, 3 and
the right to engage in specific business or professional occupations.

4

One

illustration will suffice. The New York State Workmen's Compensation

Board reduced by one-half the commuted value of a death benefit to be

paid to a decedent workman's widow and minor daughter, both residents
and nationals of Italy, on the grounds that the New York law permitted

such action in the case of non-resident aliens. The appellate division
reversed this determination, because it was in conflict with the nationaltreatment clause of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the United States and Italy. The court held that the existence of
discrimination in violation of the treaty was to be determined under

national law, not by the state board.
The provision of the Treaty . . . contains subject matter proper for negotiation
between sovereign governments and, as the Treaty is self-executing, it operates
75. McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented
Perspective, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 178 (M. McDougal ed. 1960).

76. Most treaties to which the United States is a party concern "public" international legal
rights rather than private ones. Today the United States abides by over 1430 treaties and other
agreements and belongs to nearly 80 international organizations. Warren, World Order Under Law,
address to the Geneva World Conference on World Peace Through Law, July 9-14, 1967. By 1960,
the United States had entered 130 bilateral commercial agreements, aimed primarily at private
rights.

WILSON, UNIT-ED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW I

(1960).

77. Warev. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 199 (1796).
78. Fairfax's Deviseev. Hunter's Lessee, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 379 (1813).
79. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879);
Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 124 (1817).
80. Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 272 (1806).
81. Neilsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
82. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (193 1).
83. Baker v. City of Portland, 2 F. Cas. 472 (No. 777) (D. Ore. 1879).
84. AsaKura v.City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
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without the need of any legislation. Hence, it must be applied and given
authoritative effect by the courts of this State."

On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the contention that
state law was authoritative in the case as a valid exercise of state police
86
powers.
Agreements dealing with clear transnational public interests,
together with their implementing legislation, also serve as a source of

national law applicable to matters with which they deal. For example,
the- Warsaw Convention fixes choice of law and jurisdictional rules for

tort claims arising under its provisions." Also, treaties dealing with
cession of land," riparian rights, 9 and migratory birds 0 have been held
to override state law. Another excellent illustration is the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade9' (GATT) as applied in a recent
California case. The City of San Francisco opened bids on electrical

generating equipment under bid forms which provided that "all
materials, supplies and equipment covered by this contract proposal
shall be manufactured in the United States" in accord with the
requirements of the California Buy American Statute. The low bid
offered equipment which contained components manufactured in

Canada, Japan, and Switzerland. When the city accepted this bid, the
next lowest bidder brought a mandamus action to compel the city to

accept its equipment which was wholly American-made. The court
85. lannone v. Radory Constr. Corp., 285 App. Div. 751, 141 N.Y.S.2d 311, 315 (1955).
CoinpareLukich v. Department of Labor &Indus., 176 Wash. 221, 29 P.2d 388 (1934).
86. lannone v. Radory Constr. Corp., I N.Y.2d 671, 133 N.E.2d 708, 150 N.Y.S.2d 199
(1956).

87. 49 Stat. 3000 (1936), T.S. No. 876.
88. Henderson v. Poindexter's Lessee, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 337 (1827). The power of the
national government to affect private rights in land by treaty of cession was exercised most recently
in the treaty between the United States and Mexico settling the long-standing controversy concerning the ownership of the Chamizal, a 437 acre tract of land which had been left on the American
side of the Rio Grande when the course of that river was changed by repeated avulsions and continuing accretion during the 19th century. Article 4 of the treaty provided that lands would pass "in
absolute ownership, free of any private titles or encumbrances of any kind." [1963] 15 U.S.T. 22,
T.I.A.S. No. 5515. The transaction involved the moving and rebuilding of the river channel, the
relocation of some 3,725 persons living in the disputed area, and the acquisition of private land titles
by the United States government before the treaty could be executed. See Gregory, The Chamizal
Settlement, I SOUTHWESTERN STUDIES No. 2, at 47 (1963). Senator John Tower announced that he
would refuse to vote for the treaty because it amounted to a "dismemberment" of the State of Texas
without its approval. The Attorney General of Texas stated that such approval was unnecessary and
refused to file suit to test the constitutionality of the treaty. Id. at 45.
89. See Pigeon River Improvement, Slide &Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138
(1934).
90. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
91. 61 Stat. A3 (pts. 5 &6) (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, as amended.
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refused to issue the mandatory injunction on the ground that two of the
three countries of origin were parties with the United States to the
GATT and that, therefore, the California statute and the bid forms
violated the most favored nation clause in article II of the Agreement.92
Considerably more difficulty has arisen in identifying national
power as the ultimate authority in treaties dealing with proposed internal
legal changes as part of a developing "uniform international private
law." 93 The source of this difficulty lay in the tradition that matters of
private law and, particularly, conflict of law rules were determinable
under state law and policy, except to the extent that the due process and
full faith and credit clauses placed outer limits upon state activity. These
questions were not traditionally thought of as pertaining to foreign
relations. Consequently, it was strenuously argued that these problems
were of purely domestic concern and, thus, lay outside the scope of the
treaty power.9 4 Initially the United States refused even to send delegates
to international conferences called to draft agreements concerning
private international law. When the American government finally did
participate in such a conference, held on its own soil, it pleaded its
inability to accede to agreements of this kind because of the federal
structure of its government." In the Sixth International Conference of
American States at Havana in 1928, the United States abstained from
voting on the draft of the Bustamente Code on the grounds that "in view
of the Constitution of the United States of America, the relations among
the States, members of the Union, and the powers and functions of the
Federal Government, it finds it very difficult to do so."96

The legal aspects of this position appear to have been founded upon
an implicit acceptance of the subject matter traditionally encompassed
by the term "foreign relations" as defining the scope of the treaty
power.9" But this narrow view fails to take into account the broader test
92.

Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798

(1962).
93. For a thorough and concise history of United States activities in this field, see
Nadelmann, The UnitedStates Joins the Hague Conference on PrivateInternationalLaw, 30 LAW
& CoNrEMP. PROB.

(1965).

94. See Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and International
Efforts to Unify Rules of PrivateLaw, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323, 323-29 (1954). See also Henkin, The
Constitution, Treaties and InternationalHuman Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 1012-24 (1968).
95. Nadelmann, supra note 94, at 323-31.

96.

Declaration of the United States of America in
1889-1928, at 371 (Scott ed. 1931).

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF

AMERICAN STATES

97. The classic statement of this position was made by Charles Evans Hughes before the
American Society of International Law, April 26, 1929. "But if we attempted to use the treaty power

to deal with matters which did not pertain to our external relations but to control matters which
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explicitly set forth by Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland-that the
exercise of the treaty power is proper where "an important national
interest can be protected only by national action in concert with that of
another power."9 Under this test, only two questions are relevant: (1)
Does the affected interest concern the national government?; and (2) Can
this national interest be protected by international agreement? In
connection with private international law treaties, the answer to both
questions is clearly "yes".
Writing almost ten years ago, Professor Louis Henkin pointed out
that the greatly expanded scope of national power over purely domestic
matters, indicative of a broader national interest in legal areas once
thought reserved to the states, had made it possible to pass national
legislation concerning almost all matters which might formerly have
been governed only by a treaty plus implementing legislation.99 Today,
recognition of expanding national needs in the domestic field have
broadened those categories of law which fall within the federal realm of
authority. It is doubtful today that a court would find that questions
relating to international unification of law in selected areas, or in
connection with general attempts to define conflicts rules, were subjects
which did not represent an important national interest. The practical
impossibility of effective operation within this field without the use of
international agreements is patent. 0° If the national government should
decide that it is politically feasible and practically desirable to conclude
agreements in this general subject-matter area, it seems clear that it has
the legal power to do so.
In 1964 the United States at last officially recognized its interest in
matters concerning the international unification of private law by joining
the Hague Conference of Private International Law. 10' Since that time, it
normally and appropriately were within the local jurisdictions of the States, then I again say there
might be ground for implying a limitation upon the treaty-making power that it is intended for the
purpose of having treaties made relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the people of the

United States in their internal concerns through the exercise of the asserted treaty-making power."
Proceedings,AM.Soc'y INT'L L. 1929, 196. Compare Hughes' opinion in Santovincenzo v. Egen,
284 U.S. 30 (193 1). There were, of course, important political grounds for American reluctance as
well. By asserting limitations upon its power to enter treaties dealing with private law, the United
States had a ready excuse for not participating in agreements to which it had substantive objections.
See Potter, Inhibition Upon the Treaty-MakingPower of the United States, 28 Am.J. INT'L L. 456,
461-62 (1934).
98. See text accompanying note 70, supra.
99. Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign
Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1959).
100. Compare Nadelmann, supra note 94, at 359-60.
101. See Nadelmann, supra note 93, at 291. This action was taken pursuant to enabling
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has discussed such unification and has actively participated in the
drafting of international conventions designed to bring order out of
diversity in this important field. But the State Department, quite wisely,
feels that it should proceed with caution in dealing with matters
normally exclfisively within the ambit of state authority, regardless of
the existence at the federal level of the legal power to act.' The
traumatic political experience surrounding the proposed Bricker
Amendment, 03 designed to seriously restrict the freedom of the executive
branch in international affairs, has left its scars. It is this element of
caution which has led the executive to seek the inclusion of a "federalstate" clause in some proposed conventions, providing that if a party is a
federal state then the effect of the agreement in question upon its political
subdivisions will be limited to those which specifically accept its
applicability.0 4 One such provision is found in the Draft Convention on
Recognition of Foreign Divorces and Legal Separations. 5 Another is
the Rome Institute Draft International Convention Providing a
Uniform Law on the Form of Wills. 06
The second draft convention above provides an interesting
illustration of some of the legal problems encountered in regulating
private international matters by multilateral treaty. The Convention, as
its title implies, contains as an annex a Uniform Law concerning the
form of "international" wills. 07 Each party to the Convention promises
to introduce the Uniform Law into its domestic law within six months of
the effective date of the Convention.' The federal-state clause in the
Convention provides, in substance, that the federal states which are
parties to the Convention shall have the same obligations as other
legislation, H.R.J. Res. 778 (Dec. 30, 1963), 77 Stat. 775, 22 U.S.C. § 269g (1964).
More recently, the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards was transmitted by the President to the Senate with the recommendation
that the Senate give its advice and consent to accession. VII INT'L LEG. MATER. 1042 (1968).
102. See Reese, The Hague Draft Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Divorces, 14
Am. J. ComIP. L. 692, 695-96 (1966).
103. S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953); S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953); S.J.
Res. 1, 84th Cong., lst Sess. (1955).
104. Reese, supra note 102, at 695-96. The United States has ratified the Convention on the

Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. This
Convention does not include a "federal-state" clause but does contain some special provisions
relevant to "federal-state" problems. See, e.g., arts. 5, 18, in text of Convention, 13 Am. J. ComP. L.
620, 623 (1964). This Convention is not yet in force. See61 ANI. J. INT'L L. 1019 (1967).
105. Reproduced in 14 AM. J. Com!P. L. 697 (1966).
106. Reproduced in 2 INT'L L. 251 (1968).
107. Id. at 255.

108. Art. I, Rome Institute Draft International Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the
Form of Wills.
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signatories, to the extent that the articles of the Convention and its
Annex "come within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal
authority . ."
Clause (b) of this article requires that where the
provisions of the Convention or of its Annex:
come within the legislative jurisdiction of constituent states . . .which are not,
under the constitutional system of the federation, bound to take legislative action,
the federal Government shall bring such articles with a favorable recommendation
to the notice of the appropriate authorities of constituent states . . . at the earliest
possible moment. 9

Clearly, the United States has thie power to agree with other nations
that it will recommend to its constituent states the passage of the
uniform legislation. It is believed that, in addition to this treaty power, it
has also the power to enact such uniform legislation as national law,
because of the national interest in uniformity in private international law
matters. This interest in uniformity is common to both the states and the
nation. The several uniform laws already promulgated by the states have
as their principal justification the need for uniform national treatment of
matters with which they deal. The strength of this interest, even in purely
domestic matters, has been demonstrated by Judge Henry Friendly in a
case which held that a federal common law of sales governed a contract
between the United States and a private contractor. Drawing the
applicable federal rule from the Uniform Commercial Code, Judge
Friendly wrote:
When the states have gone so far in achieving the desirable goal of a uniform law
governing commercial transactions, it would be a distinct disservice to insist on a
different one for the segment of commerce, important but still small in relation to
the total, consisting of transactions within the United States.''

The impossibility of maintaining that desired uniformity is illustrated by
the diversity of interpretations under existing "uniform" state
legislation." ' Tljis difficulty is substantially increased where
international uniformity is the goal. The problem is illustrated by the
provisions of article 4 of the Draft Law of International Wills: "(1) The
will shall be signed by the testator in the presenceof the witnesses and of
the person qualified to receive it, and (2) the signature of the testator
shall be placed at the end of the will." 2 The two italicized phrases have
109. The clause appears in an unnumbered article marked "(for possible insertion)". Supra
note 106 at 254-55.
110. United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674,676 (1966).
111. See Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 1O, 103-04 (1951); Schnader, Why the Commercial Code Should be "Uniform",

69 Com. L. J. 117, 118 (1964).
112. 2 Itcr'L L. 251, 255 (1968) (emphasis added).
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been the subject of many and varied interpretations in cases arising
under the laws of the several states of the United States. It would be
clearly inappropriate to subject these phrases, contained in what is
intended to be an internationally uniform arrangement, to varying state
interpretations. To add the diversities of these state interpretations to the
already difficult problem of maintaining international uniformity under
different legal systems would, it is submitted, make international
measures in these areas unworkable. It has for some time been argued
that this national interest in uniformity would justify the enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code as federal legislation." 3 Where there is
an international interest in uniformity, recognized by the national
government in an international treaty, it should be clear that power
exists to give effect to that interest by national legislation. Thus, the
whole subject of international unification of private law is properly
within the federal legislative power.
3. FederalStatutes.-In considering the reach of federal statutes
in private international law, three types of statutes and questions may be
delineated. The first is a federal statute expressly directed to private
international law matters. The second concerns the reach into the
international law area of federal statutes not expressly directed thereto.
The third involves the choice between a federal statute and foreign law
and the enforcement of the applicable law.
-In the first type, a federal statute which enacts a private
international law rule for matters within the powers of Congress is
controlling. The Congress, however, has exercised this power sparingly.
One instance is the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act which put in statutory
form the provisions of an international convention concerning bills of
lading which had been ratified by the Senate with some reservations." 4
Another illustration is the statute which makes valid a provision for the
arbitration of future disputes under contracts in foreign, as well as
interstate, commerce." 5 The interpretation of these statutes is a matter of
federal law." 6
Within the second type are statutes enacted under the interstate and
foreign commerce power which ordinarily do not specify the range of the
commerce they are intended to reach. The scope of operation of these
statutes in the international area is a matter of federal law to be
113. See generally Braucher,supra note 11I.
114. Carriage of Goods By Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1964).
115. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
116. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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determined ultimately by the Supreme Court of the United States. The
cases reveal at least three methods or stages of development.
The first stage is illustrfted by two cases, one an action between two
American corporations for damages resulting from a violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law," 7 the other an action by a railroad trainman
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act."' In each case the method
and language employed by the Supreme Court were derived from the
vested rights theory of choice of law; that is, the law of the place of the
act governs. This old principle of conflict of laws has been rejected by
many state courts and by the American Law Institute in Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws, and it has been disparaged in opinions of the
Supreme Court itself. "9 Almost certainly this method will not be decisive
in future cases.
The second stage is one of literal interpretation and application of
the statute in the international area. This approach is illustrated by the
Timken case,2 0 in which the government charged that an arrangement of
an American company with its own foreign subsidiaries was a violation
of the Sherman Law. The majority of the court, rejecting the view that
foreign trade conditions should be taken into account in determining the
effect of the statute, held that the statute was violated. The dissenting
opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson urged that, in the light of
the conditions of international trade, the arrangements attacked were
not unreasonable and were not condemned by the statute:
When as a matter of cold fact the legal, financial, and governmental policies deny
opportunities for exportation from this country and importation into it,
arrangements that afford such opportunities to American enterprise may not fall
under the ban of a fair construction of the Sherman Act because comparable
arrangements regarding domestic commerce come within its condemnation.,''

The third and present stage is the determination of the reach of the
federal statute in the light of its purpose and of the international
conditions to which it might extend. In one case the Supreme Court
applied the Lanham Trade-Mark Act to an American national and
117. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
118. New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925).
119. "In determining which contact is the most significant in a particular transaction, courts
can seldom find a complete solution in the mechanical formulae of the conflicts of laws.
Determination requires the exercise of an informed judgment in the balancing of all interests of the
states with the most significant contacts in order best to accommodate the equities among the
parties to the policies- of those states." Vanston Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1946)
(Black, J.). See also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1962) (Warren, C.J.);
Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943) (Black, J.).
120. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 605-06 (1951).
121. Id.
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resident and to his sales in Mexico of inferior watches under a wellknown American trademark, because the trade practices "radiate
unlawful consequences here" even though they "were initiated or
consummated outside the territorial limits of the United States." '22 In a
second case, the Jones Act was denied application to a maritime injury
suffered on a Danish ship in Havana harbor by a Danish seaman who
had signed ship's articles in New York by which he agreed to be bound
by Danish law. Justice Jackson stated:
• . .in the absence of more definite directions than are contained in the Jones Act it
would be applied by the courts to foreign events, foreign ships and foreign seaman
only in accordance with the usual doctrine and practices of maritime law.
. . . Maritime law, like our municipal law, has attempted to avoid or resolve

conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact
between the transactions and the states or governments whose competing laws are
involved.'23

A third case involved the possible extension of the National Labor
Relations Act to ships owned by a foreign subsidiary of an American
corporation and which flew the flag of Honduras, carried foreign crews,
and had other contacts with the nation of the flag. The parties to the case
agreed that Congress had the constitutional power to apply the Act to
foreign crews, at least while they were in American waters. The Court,
however, rejected the contention that the Act should be read literally
and, therefore, applied to the situation. It did so, as Mr. Justice Clark's
opinion put it, because of "the well-established rule of international law
that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a
ship .

. .

. [and] the possibility of international discord . .

.

. [and]

Honduras". 24

retaliatory action from other nations as well as
In the third type of situation concerning the reach of federal statutes
in private international law are numerous cases involving either
American regulatory statutes, such as the Sherman Act, where the
primary question was the effect of the American law, or else tort laws for
the protection of employees when the foreign law was so much less
liberal that alternative relief under the foreign nation's law was not
sought by the complainant. If the case does involve the choice between a
federal law and the law of a foreign nation, and if relief is sought through
the choice and application of the foreign law, the applicable rules are
determined by federal law. The question of choice of the federal statute is
only another form of inquiry as to the reach of the statute which, as
122. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
123. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,581-82 (1953).
124. McCulloch v. Sociedad National de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963).
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pointed out above, is surely a matter of federal law. This whole set of
conflicts problems in both choice and application of law should be
governed by one law, federaf law. It was so held in a case in admiralty in
which a Panamanian seaman sought relief under the Panama Labor
Code and in which a defense was the Panamanian statute of limitations.
Circuit Judge (now Mr. Justice) Harlan spoke for a unanimous court in
giving relief under the Panamanian law and in holding that its statute of
limitations was not a bar. In doing so he held also that state limitation
periods had no application.'25
4. Federal Courts Law.-There is a body of federal courts law of
which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are an example. Such a body
of law, applicable in the federal courts and not elsewhere, is very different from a true federal common law which is national law, binding on the
state courts and the federal courts alike. Unfortunately, there was a body
of federal courts law which for nearly a century masqueraded as "federal
common law." This old pretender must be sketched and pushed aside
before the true federal common law is considered.
The misnamed law was set on its way in 1842 by Swift v. Tyson.'26
There a Maine indorsee of a bill of exchange brought an action against
the New York acceptor, who refused to pay because of fraud in the
procurement of the bill. The decisive question was whether past
consideration given by the indorsee was value for the purpose of cutting
off the equity of defense of the acceptor. If the action had been brought
in a state court, say in Maine or New York, it would have been essential
to determine first which state's law should be chosen and applied on the
subject of value; however, the action was brought in a federal court in
New York. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Story,
ignored the choice of law problem, and therefore, the local laws of Maine
and New York, and decided for itself that past consideration was
"value". Justice Story laid down the principle that a federal court in a
diversity of citizenship case would itself determine "questions of general
commercial law," saying:
The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the languages of
Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde. . .to be in a great measure,
not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world.'"
125. Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
126. 41 U.S. 1 (1842); See, Note on Swift v. Tyson, Its Antecedents and Rise, and the
Intimations of Its Fall,

(1953), at 614-621.
127. Id. at 18.
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Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' squarely overruled Swift v. Tyson and

held "[tihere is no federal [courts] general common law." The overruling
of Swift v. Tyson by the Erie case was quickly extended to conflict of
laws in interstate cases, and consequently it was held that "the federal
courts in diversity of citizenship cases are governed by the conflict of
laws rules of the courts of the states in which they sit.""' The reasons
given for the rejection of a federal courts common law apply with full
force to private international law cases, so there should be no separate
private international law for the federal courts.
An unfortunate incidence of the Erie case is that its sweeping
language in rejecting the misnamed federal common law may tend to
keep the courts from recognizing the existence of the true federal
common law. This was so in an action against insurance companies
which involved an expropriatory and annulling decree of the Cuban
government and the measure of conversion of Cuban pesos into American dollars. The court ignored the international elements and, relying on
intranational cases, said: "In diversity cases, a Federal court must follow
1
and apply the conflict of laws rules of the state in which it sits."'30
5. Federal Common Law. - The opening words of Article I1I1, the

judicial article of the Constitution, deserve repetition. "The judicial
power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." Do these words, coupled with the principle of separation of
powers, vest in the federal courts power to create a federal common law,
with that law itself subject to modification by the Congress? For
common lawyers the answer is plainly, "yes." The common law of
England was made by the English courts. This common law was brought
by the English colonists with them as part of their heritage. When the
colonies declared their separation from Great Britain they, in their new
form of states, adopted reception acts which made the common law a
part of the laws of the several states.'3' The law so received was not
128. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
129. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 503 (1941), citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
130. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966).

131.

An example is the reception provision in the Constitution of the State of New York:

"Such parts of the common law, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New York, as
together did form the law of the said colony, on the nineteenth day of April, one thousand seven
hundred and seventy five . . . and such acts of the legislature as are now in force, shall be and
continue the law of this state, subject to such alterations as the legislature shall make concerning the
same. But all such parts of the common law . . . as are repugnant to this constitution, are hereby
abrogated." N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 14. The reception of English law is considered in KiNIBALL,
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merely a body of rules, but also included the common law judicial
process itself, a vital element of which is the appropriate development of
law by the courts.
It may be objected that the Constitution does not explicitly grant
this power to the courts. Yet beyond doubt there is a true federal
common law which is as much a part of the law of the land as is a statute
of Congress. Justice Brandeis stated that there is such a law and applied
it in a case involving the apportionment of the waters of an interstate
river.' 32 That case was decided the same day as the Erie case in which the
same justice wrote the opinion -overthrowing the misnamed federal
common law of Swift v. Tyson. The necessity for federal judge-made law
was stated by Justice Jackson with his usual force:
Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This
follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes, and

is apparent from the terms of the Constitution itself.

He went on to explain the basis and the substantial sources of federal
common law:
Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes and is
conditioned by them. Within these limits federal courts are free to apply the
traditional common law technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of
the common law in cases such as the present.t33

The grants of numerous specific powers over international matters to the
three branches of the federal government and the imposition of
corresponding limitations on the states do not exhaust the range of the
powers of government. Here, the whole is greater, much greater, than the
sum of the parts. There are inherent powers in the United States as a
nation incident to its position in international relations. One illustration
will suffice. United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp. involved the
constitutionality of a joint resolution of Congress which made unlawful
the sale of munitions of war to warring countries if the President found
that the prohibition of sale would contribute to the re-establishment of
peace. The validity of the resolution was attacked on the ground that it
was an unlawful delegation of law-making power by the Congress to the
executive. The Supreme Court upheld the resolution on the explicit
ch. 6, § 1 (1966); SMITH, CASES AND
ch. 9 (1965).
132. See note 4 supra. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92, 110 (1938).
133. D'Oench, Duhme &Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942). The
subject is convincingly discussed in Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common
Law. 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); Hill, The Law-Making Power of the United States Courts'
ConstitutionalPreemption,67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1042 et seq.
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM

MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
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ground that "the differences between the powers of the federal
government in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect
of domestic or internal affairs are fundamental." The opinion of the
Court pointed out that power in the international area does not depend
upon express language of the Constitution, but is inherent in the national
government as the representative of a nation among nations:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution ....
As a member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United States in
that field are equal to the right and power of the other members of the international
family. 34

The courts of the United States, in which is vested "the judicial power of
the United States," have all powers in international matters appropriate
to the national judicial function.
As to what matters of private international law, is it appropriate
that the national judicial function be exercised by establishing a national
law, in the absence of directions from other branches of the government?
The answer turns on the strength of national concern in the particular
matter measured against the values of state powers reserved under the
tenth amendment. All matters within the nation are, in some sense, of
national concern. No state lives unto itself alone, and strength within the
states is the foundation of the strength of the nation. Yet something
more than this all-pervading national interest is essential before national
concern is a basis of national power.
In the area of private international law there are special
considerations which may call for a broadened range of national power
and national action. International relations are inherently of national
concern, not primarily of state concern. The numerous treaties which
deal with private rights' 35 and the increasing international efforts to unify
the private laws of the nations and the rules of private international
law"36
' are evidence in point. In determining which arm of the national
government should take the initiative in establishing and shaping
national law, it may be kept in mind that private international law is a
subject especially suited to law-making by courts rather than by
legislatures. Even in countries dominated by codes, private international
134. '299 U.S. 304 (1936).
135. The broad range of these treaties is made clear in WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMENRCIAL
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1960).

136. In 1963 a joint resolution of Congress authorized the President "to accept membership
for the Government of the United States in (I) the Hague Conference of Private International Law
and (2) the International (Rome) Institute for the Unification of Private Law, and to appoint the
United States delegates and their alternates ... " 77 Stat. 775 (1963).
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law is left to the courts for development. Similarly, Congress has wide

law-making powers over interstate conflict of laws under several clauses
of the Constitution, yet it has been content to leave most of this subject
to the courts.
There are, however, considerations opposed to national action
which for an indeterminate time may keep most of private international

law from being taken over as national law. A basic reason
already mentioned is that the state courts have dealt wisely with the area,

without parochialism or nationalism.' 3 Another reason is the reluctance
of the Supreme Court to expand its field of responsibility. For years the
Court has sought to narrow its jurisdiction so as to confine its work
within limits bearable by a single panel of nine men. The Court will
scarcely welcome the task of developing the whole corpus of private

international law. A third reason is the unhappiness of the justices over
past efforts of the Supreme Court to deal with conflict of laws. For a
time the due process clause was used by some members of the Court in a
way which threatened to impose on the states the now discredited vested

rights theory of choice of law."' The Court has moved very slowly in
exercising the power it possesses even over interstate conflict of laws.' 39 A
companion reason is the rapidly developing character of the subject of

conflict of laws and the unwillingness of the justices to fetter this
development by imposing a particular set of rules in either private

interstate or private international matters. What we may expect is a slow
expansion of federal judicial law in those areas of private international
law which are of.high federal concern. As Mr. Justice Harlan put it in
the Sabbatino case: "Principles formulated by federal judicial law have
been thought by this Court to be necessary to protect uniquely federal
137. The effect of the fairness and wisdom of the state courts inpreserving state authority in
this field has its analogy in the reverse effect in areas where state action is faulty or lacking. "Mr.
Justice Frankfurter often warned that proof of a wrong was not alone enough to justify judicial, still
less, constitutional intervention. Ideally he was correct. . . . But government is more pragmatic
than ideal.. . . I f one arm of government cannot of will not solve an insistent problem, the pressure
falls upon another. I suspect that a careful study would reveal that the Supreme Court today is most
'activist' in the areas of the law where political processes have been inadequate, because the problem
was neglected by politicians." Cox, The Role of the Supreme Courtin American Society, 50 MARQ.
L. REV. 575, 592 (1967).
138. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing,
259 U.S. 209 (1922).
139. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote: "Indeed, I think it difficult to point to any field in which the
Court has more completely demonstrated or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards
of a legal character than in trying to determine what choice of law is required by the Constitution."
Jackson, Full Faithand Credit The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1; 16
(1945).
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interests."' 40 Several areas of unique or high federal concern are suggested below as now being appropriate for federal judicial law.
(a) Activities of The Federal Government and Its Agencies.When the federal government or an agency assumes obligations, federal
law may determine its liabilities and its rights against those with whom
it deals. An illustration within the United States is the Clearfield Trust
Company case in which an action was brought by the United States to
recover the amount of a check drawn on the Treasury of the United
States. After the payee's name was forged, the defendant bank received
the check in due course and collected the amount of it from the
Treasurer. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas,
held the right of the United States to recover from the bank was
governed by federal common law.
The rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are
governed by federal rather than local law . . . . In absence of an applicable Act of
Congress it is for the4 federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to
their own standards.'1

Some years earlier there had been a parallel case involving an
international transaction in which a check drawn on the treasury of the
United States was sent by a government agency to Yugoslavia, where the
payee's name was forged. The check came into the possession of the
Yugoslavian branch of the Guaranty Trust Company, which later
presented and collected the check in Washington. The government
brought an action to collect from the bank the amount of the payment
made on the forged indorsement. Under the law of the District of
Columbia, where the check was drawn and payable, a forged
indorsement was ineffective. Under the law of Yugoslavia, the holder in
due course acquired good title to the instrument and the right to collect
and retain the proceeds. The Supreme Court of the United States held
that the law of Yugoslavia applied and denied recovery. Although the
Court was not entirely clear on the source of the rule of conflict of laws
which it used, Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing three years before he
overthrew Swift v. Tyson, said:
• . . under settled principles of conflict of laws, adopted by both federal and state
courts, the validity of a transfer of a chattel brought into a country by the consent of
the owner is governed by its law; and that rule applies to negotiable instruments.'

It is submitted that the liabilities of the United States on its commercial
instruments are governed by federal conflict of laws in the international
area, as they are governed by federal local law within the nation.
140. 376 U.S. 398,426 (1964).
141. ClearfieldTrust Co.v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
142. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1934).
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(b) InternationalHostile A ction.-The Constitution vests in the
federal government the whole power to provide for "the common
defense" against overt hostile action. The power of the federal
government in seizing enemy property may override state law, as for
example, when the Supreme Court struck down a state statute which
embodied the share of a corporation in the share certificate abroad." 3
The Constitution explicitly denies to the states the power of indirect
hostile action through the grant of letters of marque and reprisal and the
imlosition of duties on exports and imports,' perhaps the only forms of
indirect hostile action thought of when the Constitution was drafted. In
this century there have developed many forms of unfriendly action short
of war - even open hostilities without the declaration of war, as in
Korea and Viet Nam. Economic warfare is carried on not through the
outmoded form of naval blockade, but by blocking the transmission of
funds and goods and by expropriation of property. All these unfriendly
actions when done on the part of this country appear to be clearly within
the power of the federal government alone.
Yet in recent years, several states have on their own part taken
unfriendly action against residents of totalitarian countries in the
transfer of decedents' property abroad. One type of state statute,
protective in character, forbids the transmission of property when the
foreign beneficiary would not be entitled under the foreign law to receive
and keep the property; a second type, reciprocal in nature, denies the
right of the foreign beneficiary to take, and may even escheat the
property to the state, when the foreign country forbids the transmission
of property to this country in a corresponding situation. These are actions which the foreign nation would naturally resent. At first the Supreme Court moved hesitantly in this area, but at last decisively. Clark
v. Allen, decided in 1947, involved a California reciprocity statute in its
denial of the rights of claimants in Nazi Germany. The Attorney General of the United States attacked the statute as an invasion by the state
into the field of foreign affairs reserved to the federal government. The
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, upheld the
statute, saying:
143. Great Northern Ry. v. Sutherland, 273 U.S. 182 (1927).
144. On the prohibition of grant of letters of marque and reprisal by the States, The
FederalistPapers stated: "This [prohibition] is fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all
points which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for
whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 277 (H. Lodge ed.

1888) (Madison). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (Jay).
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Rights of succession to property are determined by local law . . . What California
has done will have some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. But that is
true of many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden line.'4

The early 1960's saw two related, but inconclusive, cases. In one the
Court struck down a reciprocal provision of an Oregon statute as in
violation of a treaty and, thus, did not reach the matter of state intrusion
into a national area.'" The other case involved a New York statute
forbidding the transmission of funds when it appeared improbable that
the distributee would enjoy beneficial' use. The majority dismissed the
appeal for want of a substantial federal question; but Mr. Justice
Douglas, with Mr. Justice Black, dissented in an opinion which
emphasized the national interest.'47
Zschernig v. Miller'" brought before the Court a thoroughgoing
Oregon statute, which, in application to heirs in East Germany, denied
their right to inherit property and called for escheat to the state unless
there was a reciprocal right to take property and to receive funds, and
unless the foreign hei's would receive the proceeds of the Oregon estate
"without confiscation." Seven members of the Court united in striking
down the application of the statute, though not all did so for the same
reason. Mr. Justice Douglas, while attempting to distinguish Clark v.
Allen, placed the decision on the ground of forbidden state intrusion into
foreign affairs, saying: "[t]he Oregon law does, indeed, illustrate the
dangers which are involved if each State, speaking through its probate
courts, is permitted to establish its own foreign policy." Mr. Justice
Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan concurred, joined in the
opiniopi of the Court, but would go further because: "[a]ll three [of the
state statutory requirements] launch the State upon a prohibited voyage
into a domain of exclusively federal competence." The case twenty years
earlier, Clark v. Allen, can be distinguished, but not on substantial
grounds. It is submitted that the Court's action in the Zschernig case
would have been more fortunate had it been placed squarely on the
ground stated in Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion: "[w]e deal here with the
basic allocation of power between the State and the Nation . . . To the
extent that Clark v. Allen . . . is inconsistent with these views, I would

overrule that decision."
The hostile action may not be by our nation but against it. In the
troubled twentieth century there has been widespread expropriation by
145. 331 U.S. 503,517 (1947).
146. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
147. loannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30 (1962).
148. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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nations of the property of foreigners. More fundamental are the communist and fascist revolutions which have been openly hostile to our
system with its continuing and more successful revolution.149 The totalitarian regimes have often expressed their opposition to this country and
its system by expropriation, cancellation of contracts, exchange control,
and other expedients of economic warfare. The United States has at
times countered such actions by the freezing of assets and by making
treaties which surrender American claims with a measure of reimbursemet, from alien assets in this country.'50 Our nation has, however, in
various ways sought to end the cold war. Surely the effect to be given in
this country to hostile action should be governed by federal law, not by
state law. Federal control is based not only on the power to provide for
the common defense, but on the powers given to the nation in matters of
money and currencies.
(c) Admiralty and Maritime Laws.-The Constitution does not
explicitly give legislative power over admiralty and maritime matters to
the federal government, yet it is settled that the power exists. A most
vexing question is where the line is to be drawn between federal power
and state power.' Wherever the line may be drawn for matters within
the territory of the United States, it is clear that the concern of the
nation, rather than of the states, is paramount over controversies arising
on the high seas and in foreign waters. Private international law
problems in admiralty ordinarily arise out of such controversies, and the
resolution of these problems should be determined by federal law. The
Supreme Court does not appear to have spoken directly on the subject.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has dealt with it in a recent
case involving personal injuries suffered by a foreign seaman on a foreign
vessel in New York harbor.' The injured man sought relief under both a
federal statute and "the federal common law of admiralty." The judges,
though divided in result, were clearly agreed that the applicable law for
both the statutory and the federal common law causes of action should
be determined according to the criteria set out by Justice Jackson in
Lauritzen v. Larsen,'53 a case which involved the reach of a federal
149. Cf.A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
150. "The freezing of Cuban assets exemplifies the capacity of the political branches [of the
national government] to assure, through a variety of techniques . . . that the national interest is
protected against a country which is thought to be improperly denying the rights of United States
citizens." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 41-2 (1964) (Harlan, J.).
151.

The problem and its difficulties are set out with vividness in G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,

THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 43

152.
153.

(1957).

Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carrier Corp., 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966).
345 U.S. 571 (1953).
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statute. In an earlier case involving an injury suffered on the high seas,
Circuit Judge (now Mr. Justice) Harlan was explicit that "the federal
choice-of-law rule applies here."' 54 Other areas in which the national
interest is of obvious paramount importance in the international area are
aviation and atomic energy.' 5
(d)

The Money Power.-Duringthe Revolutionary War and under

the Articles of Confederation, the economy of the nation was plagued by
the variety and unsettled character of the circulating media of exchange.
Thus, the Constitution gives to the Congress wide power over money and
denies specific powers to the states in this regard. Since these early days
monetary troubles have occurred both locally and world-wide. The great
depression of the 1930's and the Second World War led the federal
government, first, to devalue the American dollar, and then to join by
treaty in an effort to stabilize the currencies and to facilitate both the
protection of national currencies and international exchange through the
International Monetary Fund.' 56 They have led as well to federal
regulation of international activities of American banks.' 7 The
continuing national interest and activity in international monetary
problems make manifest that these are not matters properly within the
control of the states. The resolution of international legal problems as to
the circulating media of exchange should, it is believed, be made by
federal law. Two aspects will be mentioned.
Exchange control is a device used for the protection of a nation's
currency and economy, or, as with Nazi Germany, as an instrument for
building up a hostile war machine. The Bretton Woods Agreement,
creating the International Monetary Fund, is effective as a treaty.' 8 The
whole subject of exchange control is, therefore, so intertwined with
monetary policy and international relations that manifestly it should be
governed by national law.'59 Judgments for money in an American court
are required by federal statute to be in dollars.'60 The wide fluctuations in
the value of currencies since the outbreak of the First World War has
154. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
155. The swift development of the pre-eminence of federal aviation law is described in D.
BILLYOU, AIR LAW chs. I & 1I(2d ed. 1964).
156. See A. NUSSBAUM,A HISTORY OFTHE DOLLAR (rev. ed. 1957).
157. See Danl, International Operations of U.S. Banks: Growth and Public Policy
Implications,32 LAW &CONTEMP. PROB.. 100 (1967).
158. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
159. Cf. Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953).
160. "The money of account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars. . . and all
proceedings in the courts shall be kept and had in conformity to this regulation." 31 U.S.C. § 371
(1964) (derived from Act of April 2, 1792, ch. 16, § 20, 1Stat. 250).

19681

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

made it necessary to determine the time as of which a debt which is
expressed in a foreign currency and is sued on in an American court will
be converted into dollars for purposes of the judgment. The Supreme
Court, in dealing with such cases after the First World War, appears to
have been guided by the now discredited vested rights theory.1 61 The
Court of Appeals of New York has dealt with the same problems on a
different basis.'62 Without regard to the comparative merits of the two
lines of cases, it is submitted this is a proper matter for federal law.
(e) Judgments and Arbitral A wards.-In the Hilton case outlined
above,' 3 the majority of the Supreme Court invoked the reciprocity
principle as a ground for refusing to enforce a judgment for money given
in France in favor of a Frenchman against an American. Both the
majority and the minority members of the Court stressed the
international aspects of the case, and in their language seemed to assume
that the subject is one for federal law. Speaking for the majority, Justice
Gray said: "[in the absence of statute or treaty, it appears to us equally
unwarrantable to assume that the comity of the United States requires
anything more."' 64 Chief Justice Fuller in dissent wrote: '[A]nd it is for
the government, and not for its courts, to adopt the principle of
retortion, if deemed under any circumstances desirable or necessary.""1 '
The question whether federal law or state law should govern the matter
was later explicitly raised in the Court of Appeals of New York. Judge
Pound referred to the argument that "questions of international
relations and the comity of nations are to be determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States so the Hilton case was controlling." He
rejected the argument and employed state law, because "the question is
one of private rather than public international law."' 66
There is the closely related matter of the enforcement of a provision
for arbitration abroad and the consequent validity of the arbitration
award. The Court 'of Appeals of New York held such a provision to be
valid as to arbitration in Moscow under a contract between an American
corporation and the Amtorg Trading Corporation, a New York
corporation which was an agency of the Soviet Government for carrying
on trade in this country. 67 The court so held despite the objection that
161. Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926).
162. Hoppev. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 497 (1923).
163. See note 2supra.
164. 159 U.S. at 228 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
166. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 387, 152 N.E. 121,
123 (1926).
167. Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Cambden Fibre Mills, Inc., 304 N.Y. 519, 109 N.E.2d 606

(1952).
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the arbitrator which was designated, the U.S.S.R. Chamber of
Commerce Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, was subject to the
supervision of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and was
controlled by the Soviet Union, as was the Amtorg itself. The decision is
a fortunate one, but it does not answer this question: should the validity
of an arbitration provision of a type common in international contracts
of a communist country turn on the several laws of the fifty states or on
federal law? The national concern is the more obvious because the case
involves a trading method employed in most of Eastern Europe.
The judgment of a court and, in a communist country, the rendition
of an award by a commission are individualized official actions and in
this sense are like "an act of State," which, as seen below, is governed by
federal law. In addition, the grounds urged or used for refusing effect to
a foreign judgment or to a provision for foreign arbitration involve
criticism of foreign methods of law enforcement. To employ the
reciprocity principle is to refuse to look to the fair result in the particular
case and deliberately to do injustice to this foreign plaintiff, simply
because an American plaintiff in a wholly different case would have a
similar injustice done to him. To refuse to give effect to the stated
provision for arbitration would be to impugn a basic element in the
foreign trade of the Soviet Union. Such actions critical of the
institutions of foreign nations should be done only when sanctioned by
68
our national law.'
6.

Federal Executive Law.-In addition to this

"vertical"

conflict between state and federal law, there is the question of the
"horizontal" allocation of power within the national governmental
structure, resulting from the tripartite nature of our government. This
question is of particular importance in the field of foreign affairs. This
section deals with the President as law-maker and with his authority to
determine the outcome of a broad range of private international cases by
the exercise of executive power.
This Presidential law-making power is the result of an implicit
"necessary and proper" clause read into the constitutional grant of
general executive power. The authority of the federal executive,
therefore, to make law in certain categories of private international cases
does not depend upon an express grant of power in the Constitution.
168.

Among the policies supporting recognition of foreign adjudication discussed in a recent

closely analytical article is "an interest in fostering stability and unity in an international order in
which many aspects of life are not confined to any single jurisdiction." Von Mehren & Trautman,
Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. Ruv.
1601, 1603-04 (1968).
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Those few instances in which the document makes direct reference to
Presidential power in foreign affairs deal solely with his power to create
external relationships-to receive or appoint ambassadors and to make
treaties. 9 All other executive powers derive from the general grant of
authority in the first sentence of Article I .'7 In this sense, the executive
power in foreign affairs is an inherent power, given content by the
operation of two major forces-the historic nature of the executive office
as the sole representative of a country in the international arena, and the
vast scope of executive responsibility increased daily by the growing
complexity of the social and economic interrelationships of modern
international society.
Under the law of nations, the executive speaks for his country. His
word must be accepted as the true voice of his nation. Thomas Jefferson,
writing four years after the adoption of the Constitution, made this
explicit:
As the President is the only channel of communication between the United States
and foreign nations, it is from him alone that foreign nations or their agents are to
learn what is or has been the will of the nation, and whatever he communicates as
such they have a right and are bound to consider as the expression of the nation, and
no foreign agent can be allowed to question it.-7

Burdened with this international responsibility, the executive must have
whatever domestic power he needs, consonant with the constitutional
principles upon which the government is based, to effectively support his
activities in the foreign relations field. The courts in the United States
have come to recognize, to a broad extent, the existence of power
sufficient to carry out the external duties which the "sovereign"executive must perform.
The twentieth century has seen a tremendous increase in the lawmaking power of the executive branch. This increasing power is a
function of the compenetration of human affairs on a world-wide scale,
described at the beginning of this article, and of the inadequacy of the
other branches of government to deal with the resulting problems. Only
the executive is able to gather the information and to make the often
instantaneous value judgments required by the modern conduct of
foreign relations. Neither the judiciary nor the legislature is equipped to
make these instant political decisions, to feel and respond to the nuances
of international relations, to engage in the give and take of bargaining or
169.

U.S. CoNsT. art. I1,§§ 2&3.

170.

"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of The United States of America."

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.

171.

Letter from Jefferson to Genet, Nov. 22, 1793, quoted in E. CORWIN, THE

OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957 at 178 (1957).

PRESIDENT:
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negotiation with friendly or unfriendly powers. The legislature, an
essentially deliberative body, is made up of representatives of local
constituencies. The political ties of its members are to the state or
district, not to the nation as a whole. The judiciary is primarily
concerned with the achievement ofjustice between the parties in the cases
which it decides. Thus, only the executive is adequately equipped to
operate effectively in the complex field of international politics.
The responsibilities of the executive breed corresponding power.
The interaction of this power with the dynamic forces of international
affairs creates an inertia which draws from the other two branches of
government powers which they might retain, but which are relinquished
in the interests of effective international dealings.
Yet the framers of the Constitution clearly intended that the power
over foreign affairs was to be shared by all three branches of the
government and that the principle of separation of powers was to apply
to foreign, as well as domestic, affairs.17 Thus, the legislature and the
judiciary are jealous of their powers, and properly so. But, as Professor
Edward Corwin has pointed out, the limited number of explicit
references in the Constitution to power capable of affecting foreign
relations is "an. invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing
American foreign policy.' ' 73 This struggle, together with the external
and internal forces operating upon the nation in its international
dealings, has resulted in a creative tension which has brought forth a
reallocation of law-making power and this reallocation has had a major
impact upon private international law in the United States.
In the following pages the swift recognition and development of
executive law-making power in recent years will be considered at some
length. The specific areas of power to be dealt with are: power delegated
by Congress; power to conclude executive agreements; power to
influence the interpretation of treaties; and power exercised in those
matters designated "political questions."
(a) Congressional Delegation.-Congress often delegates to the
President law-making power which would otherwise belong to the
legislature in matters affecting international relations, just as it delegates
power in internal matters. But legislative definition of the scope of that
delegation does not necessarily define the scope of the power which the
executive will ultimately exercise. Power delegated to the executive is
172. "The separation of powers is not an insulation of powers." Dickenson, The Law of
lVations as NationalLaw: "PoliticalQuestions," 104 U. PA. L. REV. 451, 457 (1956); E. CORIN,
supra note 171, at 177.
173. E. CORwIN, supranote171, at 171.
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always exercised in combination with that inherent executive power
discussed above. Thus in those international matters where authority has
been delegated, the whole of *executivepower brought to bear will always
be potentially greater than the limits described in the original act of
delegation. The leading case establishing this proposition is United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,'74 decided in 1936 and discussed
above in the section on federal common law. In that case Curtiss-Wright
contended that the joint resolution was unconstitutional because it
represented an abdication by Congress of its essential functions in favor
of the executive. The principal thrust of defendant's argument was that
Congress had not clearly designated the limits of the President's decision-making power and had thus left legislative determinations to the
executive's "unfettered discretion." The Court implicitly accepted the
truth of this allegation and assumed that such a broad delegation of lawmaking power would be unconstitutional if only domestic affairs were
concerned. But the Court held that the presidential proclamation was
constitutionally valid as an exercise of the combination of delegated
power and inherent executive power in the foreign affairs field. Justice
Sutherland, after discussing the primacy of the national government in
international affairs, wrote:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an
authorityplus the very delicate,plenary and exclusive power of the Presidentas the
sole organ of thefederalgovernment in thefield of internationalrelations-apower

which does not' require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of
course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to
the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the
maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment-perhaps, serious
embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional

legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and
freedom from statutory5 restriction which would not be admissible were domestic
affairs alone involved.'

The implications of this language are made even clearer when it is noted
that only one year before, the Supreme Court had emasculated the
National Industrial Recovery Act as representing too broad a delegation
of power to regulate domestic economic activity.' 76
There is little doubt that, given the continued vitality of the separation of powers concept of the Constitution, Congress can, when delegat174. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
175. Id. at 319-20 (emphasis added).

176. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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ing authority to the President in the foreign affairs field, circumscribe
that power to whatever extent it feels necessary when that authority is
constitutionally within its power to give or withhold. In this sense, the
President's authority finds its source in legislation, but in practice, congressional delegation in international matters has become increasingly
sweeping in scope and the inherent powers of the executive consequently
have greater and greater effect in private matters involving international
elements.
Power over foreign economic activities has increasingly shifted
from the legislative to the executive, in large part because of increased
law-making authority delegated by Congress in matters relating to
foreign commerce. These powers have been broadly exercised by the
executive. Much of this law-making authority is exercised by
administrative agencies, combining judicial and legislative, as well as
executive, functions. A consideration of their activities is not within the
scope of this paper. But outside the more traditional confines of
administrative law, the President exercises powers of broad scope which
are nearly plenary. Pertinent illustrations are found in matters
concerning tariffs and the control of foreign travel by United States
citizens.
Under the Trading with the Enemy Act,' the President may regulate or prohibit trade with designated "enemy" countries.' Under the
Export Control Act,' the President has the power to deny export
privileges to United States nationals upon a determination that such
export would be "detrimental to the national security and welfare
of the United States.""110 He may also "blacklist" foreign nationals who
divert goods to unauthorized receivers.' 1s Furthermore, the President's
determinations, made by the Office of Export Control, are not subject to
the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act' and are not subject
to judicial review."5 3 The President is empowered by statute to designate
177. f 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1etseq. (1964).
178. The President's authority is "subdelegated" to the Department of the Treasury. A
principal regulation is The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1968). These

regulations impose criminal penalties for violation.
179. 63 Stat. 7 (1949), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2021 et. seq. (1964), as amended, 79
Stat. 209 (1965).
180. 63 Stat. 7 (1949), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2021 et seq. (1964), as amended, 79
Stat. 209 § 3(a) (1965).
181. 15 C.F.R. § 381.10 (1968). These regulations are administered by the Department of
Commerce.
182. 63 Stat. 7 (1949), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2021 et. seq. (1964), as anended, 79
Stat. 209 § 7 (1965).
183. 15 C.F.R. § 382.13(d) (1968).
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those international organizations which shall be immune from suit and
which of their representatives shall have diplomatic immunity and,
therefore, has the power to determine the permissibility of private
litigation." 4
A most pointed recognition of the plenary nature of the President's
power in foreign affairs under a broad delegation of Congressional
authority is found in Chicago andSouthern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp.'85 Two domestic airlines sought judicial review of a
determination of the Civil Aeronautics Board concerning the allocation
of foreign air-routes. The Civil Aeronautics Act provided for judicial
review of the Board's findings, but made determinations concerning
foreign air transportation subject to the approval of the President. The
Supreme Court held, in a five to four decision, that once the order had
been approved by the President, it could not be reviewed judicially, even
though this approval was given before the decision was made public or
communicated to the participants. The case turned on the special nature
of Presidential expertise. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote:
It would be intolerable that the courts, without the relevant information, should
review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly
held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive
confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of
executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are
wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government,
Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to
the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for
which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has
long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial
intrusion or inquiry . . . We therefore agree that whatever of this order emanates
from the President is not susceptible of review by the Judicial Department.' 6

The Court concluded that the orders would not have been subject to
review before Presidential approval, because they were not then
"mature." As Justice Douglas effectively pointed out in dissent, the
Court's decision made Presidential approval in these cases final without
reference to any statutory standards which Congress might have
prescribed, thus giving the President absolute power over the outcome of
1 7
cases involving foreign air routes. 1
(b) Executive Agreements.-The authoritative nature of
international executive agreements as supreme national law overriding
184.
185.

22 U.S.C. § 288 (1964).
333 U.S. 103, 111(1948).

186.
187.

Id.at 111.
Id. at 117-18.
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state law has been alluded to above. The discussion below indicates
briefly the range of power over private international matters which the
President can exercise through his power to conclude agreements with
foreign governments.
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law lists three sources of

power to conclude executive agreements: pre-existing treaties; preexisting congressional authorization; and the "President's constitutional
authority," including, of course, his general power over foreign affairs.188
Important for our purposes is the fact that the President's power to enter
these agreements contributes substantially to his power to make
domestic law.
The law-making power of the President acting alone pursuant to his
constitutional authority to make agreements is dramatically
demonstrated by the Belmont case, discussed earlier.'89 But, even when
the President enters into an executive agreement ostensibly pursuant to
authority granted by a coordinate branch of the national government,
his power to create substantive rules applicable in private international
cases may actually be substantially greater than the authority delegated
as a result of the combination of delegated power and the inherent power
of the executive as international spokesman for the nation. Executive
activities under two international agreements which affect private
domestic rights are illustrative.
The first is the Warsaw Convention on International Flights,
entered by the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate in
1929. 90' The Warsaw Convention has been described as "the only
widespread substantive achievement in the unification of private law by
international agreement."'' A key provision of the Convention limited
recovery by persons injured while engaged in international air-travel to
$8,291 in gold francs.192 In 1955, in response to general dissatisfaction in
the United States with the amount of this limitation, the President called
for a conference of the Convention parties and finally signed, in 1956, a
protocol raising the limit to $16,000. This protocol was not submitted to
the Senate for advice and consent until three years later, and it was
finally withdrawn when no Senate action was taken. In 1964 the protocol
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 11921(1965).
189. See text accompanying note 66. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); see
Maier note 245, infra.

190. 49 Stat. 3000 (1936), T.S. No. 876.
191. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 497, 533 (1967).
192. 49 Stat. 3000 art. 22 (1936).
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was resubmitted to the Senate, this time with the recommendation that
advice and consent be given orily together with implementing legislation
requiring American flagcarriers to carry trip insurance in the amount of
$50,000 per passenger. When this suggestion was rejected, the President
proposed a voluntary waiver by American carriers of the Warsaw limits
up to $100,000. This the carriers refused.
At this point, the full force of executive power was demonstrated.
The Department of State issued a formal denunciation of the
Convention, to take effect six months following the notice unless
reasonable international support for a $100,000 liability limit was
demonstrated at a pending conference of the Convention in Montreal
and unless principal world carriers agreed to a provisional limit of
$75,000 until a higher one could be put into effect. The day before the
denunciation was to become effective, the State Department announced
that forty American and foreign carriers had come to terms and the
denunciation was withdrawn with a $75,000 liability substituted for the
Convention provision as to these carriers. 93 This agreement was not and
will not be submitted to the Senate. It is ostensibly only an agreement
between airline companies whose nations are Convention parties, not an
executive agreement between the nations themselves. But in view of the
fact that most foreign airlines are government-owned, this distinction
appears to make little real difference.
The private-law results of this executive power-play are substantial.
By executive agreement within the broad general structure of the
Warsaw Convention, private rights of individuals were increased more
than nine-fold with a correlative decrease in protection for the aircarriers, which, at least in so far as American flag companies are
concerned, are private corporations. More important, this result was
achieved not only without the participation of the legislative branch of
the government, but in the face of substantial sentiment in opposition. By
the use of executive power to enter agreements and to withdraw from
them, "it came about almost overnight, and without normal and
constitutional legislative processes, [that] the character of a major
international treaty changed completely."' 94
A second illustration of the dynamic exercise of executive power to
enter international agreements is found in the history of United States
participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.' 95 In 1945,
193. For a more complete history of this controversy, see generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 191; Note, PresidentialAmendment and Termination of Treaties: The Case of the
Warsaw Convention, 34 U. CmHi. L. REV. 580 (1967).
194. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 191, at 601.
195. 61 Stat. A3 pts. 5 & 6 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, as amended, and T.I.A.S. No. 6139.
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Congress passed an amendment to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act of 1934,96 in which it authorized the President to enter into what

Congress apparently intended to be bilateral trade agreements with
foreign nations. Six months after the amendment, the executive called

upon fifteen other nations to begin multi-lateraltariff negotiations. Out
of these negotiations grew the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.'97

During the early days of United States participation in GATT,
there was considerable controversy concerning whether or not the 1945
amendment actually authorized the President to enter the agreement.'98
Important for our purposes, however, is the point that even if the
President had exceeded the authority delegated to him by Congress, the
question of the validity of these legal arguments has today become moot.
By forceful executive action and continuing United States participation

in GATT, it has become economically and politically impossible for the
United States to withdraw, even if the President had exceeded his

original authority to enter upon the undertaking. Professor John H.
Jackson of the University of Michigan makes the point that the use of
the executive agreement process in this respect has had the effect of
substantially broadening the power of the executive in foreign economic
affairs.
Even assuming that GATT is valid as a matter of United States domestic law, it is
clear that the circumstances of its history have resulted in a considerable shift of
power to the executive branch without the statutory framework which defines
executive-legislative relations in connection with our participation in other
international institutions ....
199

The process by which executive law-making power has expanded by

means of the power to enter executive agreements is described with
insight by Professors Steiner and Vagts in their excellent new casebook,
TransnationalLegal Problems:
The development of the executive agreement as a vital instrument of foreign policy is
a prime illustration of a long-sanctioned practice which ripens into contemporary
constitutional doctrine. The analogy to state practice which ripens into customary
international law is evident.
Ultimately the courts may play a role in marking the limits of the executive
agreement, although many such agreements . . . are not likely to enter domestic
litigation. In practice, it appears more likely that political factors and compromises
will play a major role in determining the extent to which the agreement displaces the
treaty. . . The bargaining and tacit accords between the Executive and the Congress
over this issue resemble the resolution of questions of international law among
196. 48 Stat. 943 (1934), as amended, 59 Stat. 410 (1945).
197. See Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in UnitedStates Donestic
Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 250, 257-59 (1967).
198. Id. at 253-74.
199. Id. at 274.
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nations through accommodation and restraint rather than through binding thirdparty decisions.2 '0

(c) Treaty Interpretation.-A "treaty" has dual effects, one on
international relations, the other on the internal law of the land. As the
sole spokesman for this country in its foreign relations, the President is
the interpreter of the effect of treaties upon the international conduct of
the United States. He may determine whether or not a treaty has been
abrogated; he may state intended interpretations to foreign powers or
before international tribunals; he may bargain for revision of treaty
terms; he may assert violations by other nations. In all these aspects, the
executive is supreme and exclusive.
The interpretation of treaties to determine their domestic effect is
for the courts under Article III of the Constitution. They determine
whether a treaty is self-executing or requires additional implementing
legislation; whether it changes existing domestic law; what rights or
duties it creates for private parties; whether it supersedes or is superseded
by congressional legislation. But this seemingly neat division of powers
between the executive and the judiciary is illusory. Where the subject
matter of judicial inquiry is an agreement with a foreign nation, there
always exists the potential for substantial effect upon United States
international relations and, consequently, the possibility of
encroachment upon the sphere of the executive branch by the court.
Conversely, the very existence of executive responsibility in the
international field forces the recognition by the judiciary of the relevance
of executive pronouncements concerning the domestic effect of treaty
provisions.
Questions of treaty interpretation bring into play that creative
tension inherent in the concept of a government of separated powers. The
executive branch is careful not to assert an authoritative law-making
power on these issues. The judicial branch jealously guards its
prerogative as the interpreter for internal purposes of this supreme law of
the land. But the peculiar position of the executive as the sole
representative of the United States in the international arena makes it
imperative that its stated position be given "great weight"20' by the
judiciary, even in a "purely" private case requiring construction of treaty
terms.
Such a case was Kolovrat v. Oregon.20° A principal issue was
whether an Oregon statute requiring reciprocal rights of inheritance as a
200. H.
201.

STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

§ 152 (1965).
202. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

477 (1968).
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prerequisite for intestate succession of personal property to aliens
conflicted with a treaty between the United States and Yugoslavia. The

Oregon Supreme Court held that the language of the treaty did not apply
to Yugoslavian nationals not resident in the United States and that,
therefore, the Yugoslavian claimants could not take the property. The

United States Supreme Court reversed. Both the Department of Justice
as amicus curiae, and the petitioners had submitted briefs which

referred, in part, to diplomatic correspondence between the United
States Department of State and the Yugoslavian Foreign Ministry,

indicating that both parties interpreted the treaty, via its most-favorednation clause, to grant the broadest reciprocal rights of inheritance
without regard to actual residence of the claimants.2 "3 After a review of

the purposes of the treaty, gleaned from its other provisions, the Court
turned to this correspondence:
We have before us statements, in the form of diplomatic notes, exchanged between
the responsible agencies of the United States and of Yugoslavia, to the effect that
the 1881 Treaty, now and always, has been construed as providing for inheritance by
both countries' nationals without regard to the location of the property to be passed
or the domiciles of the nationals. And relevant diplomatic correspondence and
instructions issued by our State Department show that the 1881 Treaty was one of a
series of commercial agreements which were negotiated and concluded on the basis
of the most expansive principles of reciprocity. The Government's purpose in
entering into that series of treaties was in general to put the citizens of the United
States and citizens of other treaty countries on a par with regard to trading,
commerce and property rights. 4

In one sense, the Court's reference to diplomatic correspondence in this

case can be treated only as a search for additional evidence of the intent
of the parties which gives specific content to the language of the

agreement. The correspondence had resulted from a protest by the
Yugoslavian Government against several state court decisions similar to
the one which was appealed. 05 The State Department, while carefully
pointing out that it could not bind the courts, had agreed that the
Yugoslavian contentions produced "a reasonable construction

consonant with the spirit of the Treaty as a whole.""0 6 But it is submitted
that, even given the State Department's disclaimer of final authority

over the courts in these matters, the Supreme Court was well aware that
203. Brief for Petitioner at Appendix D; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
Appendix B, Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
204. 366 U.S. at 194-95 (footnotes omitted).
205. Letter from the Ambassador of Yugoslavia to the United States Secretary of State,
April 18, 1958, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 45, Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
187 (1961).
206. Letter from the United States Secretary of State to the Yugoslav Embassy, April 24,
1958, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 57, Kolovrat v.Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (196 1).
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any decision other than the one which it reached would have resulted in
considerable embarassment to the executive branch in the conduct of
foreign relations.
This raises an important additional question concerning the role of
the executive in domestic treaty interpretation. Suppose, in the Kolovrat
case, that the United States had adopted a restrictive interpretation of
the treaty's terms in its correspondence with Yugoslavia and that an
international dispute was underway, perhaps headed for international
adjudication. Would the United States Supreme Court make an
independent determination of the meaning of the treaty's language for
domestic purposes? Its most recent decision in the Sabbatino case °7
suggests that it would not. In that case the Court, in large part, based its
refusal to review the validity under international law of the Cuban
expropriation on the grounds that when the State Department was
engaged in negotiations a judicial determination of such a question
would create the possibility of an unavoidable conflict between the
judicial and executive branchesConsiderably more serious and far-reaching consequences would flow from a
judicial finding that international law standards'had been "met if that determination
flew in the face of a State Department proclamation to the contrary. When
articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states, the
Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and
traditional rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes
08
desirable for the community of nations and protective of nationalconcerns.

Although the factual situation in Kolovrat does not approach the
international volatility of the expropriation cases, the Court's reasoning
in Sabbatino seems equally compelling in treaty interpretation cases
when the executive is acting as an advocate of a particular legal position
in some international decision-making process. When such is the case,
the clear implication of the Sabbatino rationale is that American courts
should treat the State Department's interpretation as authoritative." 9
Where treaty matters are concerned, the Court's responsibilities under
Article I I I would hardly permit a complete refusal to adjudicate when a
clearly authoritative source of law-federal law-exists. Consequently,
the only course open, consonant with permitting continued effective
executive action in the foreign affairs field and with the required judicial
function, would be to accept the State Department's interpretation as
authoritative.
207. 376 U.S. 398, 432-33 (1964) (emphasis added). The facts of the case are set out in text
accompanying note 29.
208. Id.
209. A more extensive discussion of the Court's rationale in the Sabbatino case appears in the
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(d) Political Questions.-Thereis a body of federal common law
which delineates the shadowy borders between the proper spheres of
activity of the three branches of the federal government. This body of
principles, generally called "the political question doctrine," might well
be designated "the common law of judicial restraint." The fundamental
principle of the doctrine is that, to the greatest practical extent, the
constitutional concept of separation of powers is to be given effect by the
refusal of courts to adjudicate those cases involving the resolution of
policy questions more properly left to either the legislative or the
executive branch.
The federal common law discussed above was illustrated by cases in
which courts have developed and applied national rules of substantive
law in private international cases. Once the vertical choice of law was
made and the substantive content of the rule determined, courts applied
the federal common law doctrines in the same manner in which a court
applies any private law norm. By contrast, the political question doctrine
is negative in effect. It operates, and is intended to operate, to deny a
plaintiff or defendant his day in court, or at least, to refuse a judicial
application of private law to the settlement of his dispute. The doctrine is
employed to designate, in appropriate instances, the federal executive,
rather than the legislature or the courts, as the authoritative decisionmaker, with the realization that the decision will be based upon political
determinations and not merely upon considerations concerning the
attainment of justice between the parties in the particular case. Implicit
in the doctrine's application is the recognition that justice for these
parties is a consideration secondary to the long-term political interests of
the nation as a whole, the advancement of which is entrusted to the
President in international relations.
In the foreign affairs field, political questions include
determinations of: the existance-of a state as an entity legally
recognizable in American courts; the judicial status to be accorded to a
foreign government claiming to be the international representative of an
existing state; the legal status to be accorded to acts of a foreign
government, including the immunity of foreign sovereigns or their
representatives from judicial proceedings; and the effect to be given in
domestic courts to foreign "acts-of-state" done by governments within
their own territory.210
sub-section on the Act-of-State Doctrine, infra.

210. For an excellent discussion of the law of political questions as it has been developed by
the United States Supreme Court, see Dickenson, supra note 172.
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(1) Recognition.-The President's exclusive power to recognize
the existence of new foreign states or foreign governments rests in his
power to receive ambassadors under article II, section 3.1" That power
may be fully exercised by the executive acting alone, and its legal
consequences become fully operative either by proclamation of an
executive agreement or merely by formal public announcement."'
The executive branch in the United States treats the power of
recognition as a purely political matter whose exercise is subject to no
legal standards, either domestic or international.2 1 1 Courts in the United
States respect the essentially political nature of this act and will withhold
any decision which might interfere with the absolute nature of the
executive's power in this field. In addition, courts readily give effect to
the full implications of the executive's recognition policy. Thus, by
refusing recognition, the executive branch can deny a foreign
government access to American courts," 4 prevent the collection of
monies admittedly belonging to a foreign state when claimed by a new
but unrecognized government,"' and deny to its acts the benefits of the
act-of-state doctrine." 6
A dramatic illustration of the private law effects of the executive's
recognition power is found in Republic of China v. Merchants Fire
Assurance Corp. of New York." 7 Defendant insurance company had
issued d fire insurance policy to the Republic of China covering certain
government property. A revolutionary government came into control of
most of the Chinese mainland. This government brought suit on the
policy for an earlier fire loss in the name of the Republic of China. The
lower court (United States Court for China)2 s dismissed the suit on the
grounds that the revolutionary government had not been recognized by
the United States and therefore lacked capacity to sue. After this
decision, but before the appeal, the United States recognized the new
211.

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).

212. See I G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 166-67 (1940).
213. See UNITED STATES POLICY ON NONRECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA, DEPT. OF
STATE MEMORANDUM TO MISSIONS ABROAD, Aug. 11, 1958, in 39 DEPT. STATE BULL. 385
(1958).
214. The Rogdai, 278 F. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1920).
215. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259
(1923). Cf Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp..'59 (N.D. Cal.
1952).
216. Latvian State'Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrMh, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1951). But cf M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
217. 30 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1929).
218. For a description of this court, see I1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
571 (1941).
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government. The Court of Appeals reversed, permitting the newly-

recognized government to continue the suit. After pointing out that the
lower court's decision had been correct when it was rendered, the court
wrote:
On July 25, 1928, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China,
appointed by the President of the United States, and the Minister of Finance,
appointed by the National Government of the Republic of China, entered into a
treaty of commerce; and while this treaty has not as yet been ratified by the Senate,
it contains a clear recognition by the Executive Department of this government of
both the National Government of the Republic of China and of its accredited
representative. This recognition by the Executive Department would seem to satisfy
the requirements of the law; but, if this is not enough, we have been advised by a
telegram from the Secretary of State that the Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy

Extraordinary of the National Government of China has been officially received by

this Government, so that the recognition of the former is now settled beyond
question." 9

Perhaps the most striking effect ever given by a court to an
executive act of recognition and the policies underlying it is found in
United States v. Pink,22 decided by the Supreme Court in 1942 under
law created by the recognition of the Soviet Government by the President
in 1933. An integral part of the recognition agreement was the Litvinov
Assignment, in which the United States accepted an assignment of all
Soviet claims to "nationalized" property located in the United States in
return for a waiver of United States claims, or claims of its nationals,
against the Soviet Union for property seized during and following the
revolution. Pink, New York insurance commissioner, held funds
originally belonging to a New York branch of the First Russian
Insurance Company, which had been nationalized by the Soviets in 1918
and 1919. After Pink had paid off all the company's domestic creditors,
the New York Court of Appeals ordered him to pay the remaining funds
to foreign creditors and to a quorum of the company's former board of
directors. When the United States brought suit, claiming the funds by
virtue of the Litvinov Assignment, the Supreme Court upheld the
Government's claim.
Some unfortunate language implying retroactive legal effects solely
to the act of recognition 2 ' led many commentators to misplace the
emphasis, as later developments show.222 The importance of the decision
is not that recognition alone can retroactively validate extraterritorial
219. 30 F.2d at 278.
220. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
221.

Id.at 223.

222. See, e.g., Borchard, ExtraterritorialConfiscations, 36 Am,. J. INT'L L. 275 (1942);
Jessup, The Litvinov Assignment and the Pink Case, 36 AmI. J. INT'L L. 282 (1942).
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seizures, but rather its indication that the power of the executive to
recognize foreign governments carries with it the power to make binding
executive agreements whose provisions have the force of national law.2 3
Consequently, even though the foreign creditors would otherwise have
had a legal claim to the funds under the law of New York, the
President's exclusive power to recognize carried with it the power to
establish a policy which his political assessment of the requirements of
foreign affairs showed to be in the national interest, without regard to
the question of private justice in the particular case. The Court wrote:
If the President had the power to determine the policy which was to govern the
question of recognition, then the Fifth Amendment does not stand in the way of
giving full force and effect to the Litvinov Assignment. . . . [T]he Federal
Government is not barred by the Fifth Amendment from securing for itself and our
nationals priority against such [foreign] creditors. And it matters not that the
procedure adopted by the Federal Government is globular and involves a regrouping
of assets. . . . The powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations
included the power, without the consent of the Senate, to determine the public policy
of the United States with respect to the Russian nationalization decrees. . . . That
authority is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized. It
includes the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of recognition. Objections to the underlyingpolicy as well as objections to recognitionare to
be addressedto the politicaldepartmentand not to the courts.24

The Pink decision had the effect of taking American assets
belonging to the Russian insurance company away from its foreign
creditors and using them to pay, in part, the losses of Americans whose
property had been confiscated by the Soviet Union. In this aspect, it may
be only an aberration, brought about by the Court's realization of the
close cooperation necessary between the Soviet Union and the United
States in the midst of World War II."22 But the fact that the Court
permitted this private injustice emphasizes the importance of executive
power over political questions in the international field. Where a vital
national interest may be served by giving effect to executive policy under
the constitutional power to recognize, considerations of private justice in
individual cases give way to politically determined results.
(2) Sovereign Immunity.-The same fundamental policy
discussed above with respect to recognition is presented sharply in the
sovereign immunity cases. The effects of the "creative tension" between
the political and judicial departments of government, resulting in
preeminence of the executive as a private lawmaker, is nowhere more
223. See generally note, United States v. Pink-A Reappraisal,48 COLUI. L. REv. 890
(1948).

224. 315 U.S. at 228-29 (emphasis added).
225. See Frankfurter, J. concurring opinion, id. at 234,238-42.
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effectively illustrated than in the line of cases concerning the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Today, decisions of the State Department are the
ultimate authority in determining the permissibility of suits against
foreign sovereigns. In carrying out its role, the executive branch acts
both as a fact finder in search of recognizable sovereignty and as a quasilegislator, establishing legal rules regarding immunity to be applied to
the future. As to the first aspect, the executive communicates its finding
of sovereignty to the courts, which give it conclusive effect. In the
second, the courts accept State Department pronouncements as a rule of
law to be interpreted and applied in cases where no executive suggestion
has been communicated.
In American law, the nature of the sovereign immunity doctrine as
a "purely" political question has only recently been conclusively
established. Until the middle of this century, there was thought to exist a
body of "common law" on sovereign immunity drawn from the law of
nations, which courts were free to apply where no executive suggestion of
immunity had been filed. Even where an executive suggestion had been
made, it was not clear that courts were required to give it effect, although
they traditionally did so. This confusion stemmed, in large part, from
varying interpretations of the opinion of Justice Marshall in the leading
American case on the immunity of foreign sovereigns, The Schooner
226 In that case, a libel against a French warship
Exchange v. McFaddon.
was dismissed on a finding that, under the law of nations, a "public
armed ship" entered the port of a friendly sovereign under an "implied
license" from that government, which included a recognition of the
principle that the international equality of sovereigns established a
presumption that one would not hail another into its courts to answer
private complaints. Chief Justice Marshall expressly refused to pass on
the question of whether conclusive effect should be given to the
suggestion of immunity which the executive had filed in the case,
although the point was argued.2 27 At most, Marshall treated the
executive as the authoritative finder of the ultimate fact of sovereignty,
the determination of which automatically brought into play those
considerations of international comity upon which his decision was
based.
Doubt concerning the authoritative nature of executive action in
sovereign immunity cases was emphasized by the Supreme Court in
Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Steamship Pesaro,2 8 decided in 1926. In that
226.
227.
228.

11 U.S. (7Cranch) 116 (1812).
Id. at 146.
271 U.S.562 (1926).
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case, the Supreme Court gave effect to a plea of sovereign immunity for
a government-owned merchant ship in the face of a State Department
suggestion to the district court that immunity need not be granted.229 The
Court explicitly stated that the granted immunity was based upon the
nature of the sovereign under the requirements of the law of nations.230
Implicit in the decision was the assumption that the executive
department could not render legally inoperative the ultimate fact of
sovereignty by filing a contrary suggestion with the court.
Seventeen years later, the Court made it clear, however, that the
political question principle was controlling in sovereign immunity cases.
In Ex parte Peru, the Court gave conclusive effect to an executive
"recognition and allowance" of immunity to a government-owned
Peruvian merchant vessel. Chief Justice Stone wrote:
[Clourts may not so exercise their jurisdiction, by the seizure and detention of the
property belonging to a friendly sovereign, as to embarass the executive arm of the
Government in conducting foreign relations ...
The certification and the request that the vessel be declared immune must be
accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination by the political arm of the
Government that the continued retention of the vessel interferes with the proper
conduct of our foreign relations. Upon the submission of this certification to the

district court, it became the court's duty, in conformity to established principles, to
release the vessel and to proceed no further in the cause."'

Two years later, the Court went further. In Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, 23 2 it denied that judicial common law was an authoritative
source for decisions on sovereign immunity but recognized a kind of
"executive common law," whose substantive content was derived from
prior actions of the State Department in immunity cases. The Hoffman
case concerned a libel in rem for collision damage against a governmentowned Mexican merchant vessel operated under contract by a private
Mexican corporation. The State Department filed a statement noting the
claim of immunity and accepting the fact that the vessel was owned by
the Mexican government, but taking no position on ultimate immunity
from suit. The Court denied the immunity on the grounds that prior
State Department practice had been to refuse a recommendation when
the vessel in question was owned, but not actually possessed, by the
foreign sovereign. The Court specifically disapproved the implications of
the Berizzi Brothers opinion: "It is therefore not for the courts to deny
an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an
229. See The Pesaro, 277 F. 473,479 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
230. 271 U.S. at 574.
231. 318 U.Sr 578, 588-89 (1943).

232. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
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immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to
recognize.233
This recognition of the executive branch as the ultimate lawmaker
in sovereign immunity cases led to a "legislative enactment" by the State
Department in the form of a letter from Acting Legal Advisor Jack B.
Tate to the then Attorney General, setting forth the principles upon
which the Department would henceforth recognize immunity claims. 4
The Department repudiated the rule of absolute immunity for sovereign
acts and substituted a theory of restrictive immunity: "[T]he immunity
of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts
(Yure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (Yure
gestionis).2 35 The executive disclaimed any power to control the courts,
but the language quoted above from the Hoffman case made it quite
clear that the rule of the Tate Letter would be treated as authoritative by
the judiciary.
The Supreme Court accepted the general principles of the Tate
Letter in National City Bank v. Republic of China,236 where a
permissive counterclaim against a foreign sovereign plaintiff was
allowed when the State Department failed to suggest immunity. A more
explicit application of this "executive legislation" is found in Victory
237 In that case, involving a private
Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General.
suit against the Spanish Ministry of Commerce to compel arbitration
under a provision in a charter contract, the Second Circuit, absent an
executive suggestion, denied immunity. In doing so, it gave content to
the Tate Letter rule by defining categories of public acts for which
immunity would be granted and denying it in all other cases.23
The final demonstration of the pre-eminence of the executive as
authoritative law-maker in sovereign immunity cases, however, lies in
the fact that, while the courts consider themselves bound by expressions
of executive policy, the State Department retains its freedom to decide
immunity on a case by case basis. In at least three cases,239 the
233. Id. at 35. For a criticism of this case on the grounds that it leaves too much law-making
power to the executive, see Jessup, Has theSuprene Court Abdicated One ofIts Functions?, 40 AM.
J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
234. Letter of Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to Dept. of Justice, May 19, 1952, in 26
Dept. STATE BULL. 984 (1952).

235.

Id.

236.
237.
238.

348 U.S. 356 (1955).
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
The five categories listed were (I) internal administrative acts, such as the expulsion of

an alien; (2) legislative acts, such as nationalization; (3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4) acts
concerning diplomatic activity; and (5) public loans. 336 F.2d at 360.
239. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); New York & Cuba Mail S.S.
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Department has taken note of overriding political considerations and
has allowed a claim of immunity which, under the principles of the Tate
letter as elucidated in Victory Transport, would otherwise have been
denied.
Illustrative of this relationship between foreign policy and "the
executive common law of sovereign immunity" is Rich v. Naviera
Vacuba, S.A. 40 In that case, Cuban sailors had hijacked a merchant ship
owned by a nationalized Cuban company and had brought it to the
United States. The ship and its cargo were libeled by Mayan Lines,
S.A., in execution of a consent judgment against the Republic of Cuba,
which it had obtained in a Louisiana court, and by United Fruit Company, which claimed that the ship's cargo had been confiscated from its
plant in Cuba. The commercial nature of the vessel and her cargo
appears to be indisputable. Also, the Republic of Cuba had waived
immunity from execution of the Louisiana consent judgment. Nonetheless, the State Department suggested immunity of the ship and its cargo
from seizure and the court concluded:
[t]he certificate and grant of immunity issued by the Department of State should be
accepted ... without further inquiry. We think that the doctrine of the separation
of powers under our Constitution requires us to assume that all pertinent
considerations have been taken into account by the Secretary of State in reaching
his conclusion.-

These "pertinent considerati6ns" had little to do with the policies
expressed in the Tate Letter. The State Department, two days after the
hijacking incident, had agreed with the Cuban government that it would
release the ship in return for reciprocal action concerning an Eastern
Airlines plane which had been hijacked and taken to Cuba the month
before.24 A political determination of this kind is exactly the sort which
the political question doctrine is designed to preserve from judicial
interference. It should be noted, however, that the Department's
determination affected private rights substantially. In effect, the
Department substituted the return of the plane to Eastern Airlines for
recovery of an oustanding judgment by Mayan Lines and for recovery of
the confiscated sugar by United Fruit.
Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v.
Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864, cert denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966).
240. 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
241.

Id. at 26.

242. ,Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710, 714-15 (E.D. Va. 1961); see 45

DEP'T
STATE BULL. 407 (1961); Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions:
Recognition of Prerogativeor Abdication to Usurper?,48 CORNELL L. Q. 461,464-67 (1963).
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(3) Act-of-State.-The recently concluded litigation in the
243 controversy, together with its
Sabbatino
legislative aftermath,244

provide perhaps the most striking illustration found in the annals of
American constitutional history of the interplay between the separated
powers of the branches of our federal government. Whatever the
practical results of the outcome may be in terms of its actual effect upon
private rights in cases involving foreign acts of state or upon the
confiscation of American-owned property by foreign governments, the
controversy focused a tremendous amount of scholarly, judicial, and
legislative expertise upon vital questions concerning the constitutional
structure of our government. In one way or another, the Sabbalino
problem raised most of those questions concerning the authoritative
sources of private international law with which we have dealt
throughout this article. It is thus fitting to conclude this part of our
treatment with an analysis dealing with that case and the doctrine on
which it was based. It is treated under the heading "federal executive
law" because it culminated in a judicial and legislative recognition of
executive power in the field of private international law which was
considerably more explicit than any theretofore available. As a
preliminary, to demonstrate this result, it will be useful to outline the
history of the act-of-state doctrine before dealing at some length with the
Sabbatino case.

The act-of-state doctrine in American law is closely related to the
principle of sovereign immunity.245 Both stemmed, initially, from
conceptions of absolute territorial sovereignty and the relationship
between those conceptions and a power-oriented theory of jurisdiction
which equated physical power over parties with a right to decide their
disputes and lack of such power with a lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the
adjudication of disputes concerning either the person or the acts of a
foreign sovereign was conceived as the application of physical force
against the sovereign personality. But the decision to apply force to a
foreign sovereign is essentially political in nature. It is not to be made
upon the accident of the presence of the sovereign, or of one claiming
legal rights based upon the validity of the sovereign's acts, before a court
whose even-handed justice could be enforced only by the exercise of its
own sovereign's power. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall, in The Schooner
243. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The facts of the case are
set forth in text at note 15 supra.
244. 78 Stat. 1013, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (Supp. 11 1965-66).
245. See Maier, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State: Correlative or Conflicting Policies?,
35 U. CIN. L. REV. 556 (1966).
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Exchange, found an "implied license" for territorial penetration by the
French public ship. If power was to be exercised against it, it was to bd
24 6
done by command of the political branch, not by the judiciary.
Similarly, the earliest American act-of-state case, Hatch v. Baez, used
the vivid language of military attack, emphasizing that physical power
to nullify the acts of a foreign sovereign is not be be applied upon judicial
determination alone. Dismissing a suit against the former President of
Santo Domingo, based on acts done in his official capacity, the court
wrote:
To make him amenable to a foreign jurisdictioh for such acts, would be a direct
assault upon the sovereignty and independence of his country. The only remedy for
such wrongs must be sought through the intervention of the government of the
person injured ....
,"

Like the Supreme Court in McFaddon, the New York court found the
applicable principle in public international law.
The general rule, no doubt, is, that all persons and property within the territorial
jurisdiction of a State are amenable to the jurisdiction of its courts. But the
immunity of individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within
their own States, in the exercise of the sovereignty thereof, is essential to preserve the
peace and harmony
of nations, and has the sanction of the most approved writers on
248
international law.

The rule of Hatch v. Baez was adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Underhill v. Hernandez,249 a case of essentially similar facts.
Throughout its earlier history, the act-of-state doctrine was
variously described as a doctrine of international law, a doctrine of
conflicts of law, or as derived from the concept of separation of
powers.250 It was applied by the courts without recourse to executive
intervention, perhaps because it was primarily applicable in suits
between private parties which did not afford an incentive for the State
Department to communicate its wishes directly to the court. Professor
Eugene Mooney in his helpful book, Foreign Seizures, demonstrates
effectively that, although the executive did not intervene directly in actof-state cases, the courts were fully aware of the relationships between
the doctrine and foreign political requirements. He contends, with
ample supporting evidence, that it was always applied by the courts in a
246.
247.
248.

Schooner Exchangev. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 141 (1812).
7 Hun 596, 599-600 (N.Y. App. Div. 1876) (emphasis added).
Id. at 600.

249. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
250. See Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J.

INT'L L. 826 (1959); Hyde, The Act
of State Doctrineand the Rule of Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 635 (1959); Comment, "Act of State"
Immunity, 57 YALE L.J. 108 (1947).
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manner consonant with the then prevailing national policy of the United
States, whether in giving full effect to Latin American revolutionary
seizures as encouragement to throw off European domination, compatible with the theory of the Monroe Doctrine, or in protecting
American nationals when they claimed title based upon Soviet seizures
during the Russian revolution."'
The first instance of direct executive intervention in an act-of-state
occurred in litigation involving attempts to recover property seized by
the National Socialist Government of Germany. In Bernstein v. van
Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme,2 52 Judge Learned Hand applied the

act-of-state doctrine to refuse adjudication of the legal validity of a
Nazi confiscation which had occurred before World War II. When in a
succeeding case involving the same seizure, the State Department
indicated to the court that the act-of-state doctrine need not be applied
in cases involving Nazi confiscations and the court accepted the suggestion as conclusive, the so-called "Bernstein Exception" to the act-ofstate doctrine was born."' This new rule, recognizing law-making
power in the executive branch which could be exercised on a case-bycase basis, had a rational basis only if the source of the doctrine was the
separation of powers concept, rather than a separate body of international or conflicts law. Although the "Exception" became the subject
of some comment in legal literature, 4 there was no regular application
of it by the executive other than in the cases mentioned.
The stage was set for the struggle between the three separated
branches in the Sabbatino litigation. It began when the Federal Court
for the Southern District of New York attempted to expand the judicial
role in act-of-state cases by use of the traditional common law
method.255 Implicitly rejecting the view that the "Bernstein Exception"
permitted judicial intervention in act-of-state cases only when express
permission was granted by the executive branch, Judge Dimock treated
the rule as purely one of "self-imposed restraint," which could be lifted
in appropriate cases where, if the act of the foreign sovereign was alleged
to violate international law, exercise of the judicial function would not
embarrass the executive. Finding no such embarrassment in the light of
State Department objections to the Cuban seizures, the court applied
251. See generally, MOONEY, FOREIGN SEIZURES (1967), especially chapters 1-3.
252. Bernstein v. van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
253. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
254. See, e.g., Zander, note 250 supra;Hyde note 250 supra.
255. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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principles derived from public international law to create, in effect, a
federal common law rule denying effect to the Cuban confiscation. The
Court of Appeals for theSecond Circuit affirmed." 6
The Supreme Court reversed, making it clear that executive power
was authoritative in act-of-state cases. Its decision represented a value
judgment that judicial determinations aimed at attaining justice in the
individual case were not permitted where broader questions of foreign
policy were involved. After pointing out that the authoritative source of
the doctrine was neither the Constitution nor public international law,
the Court wrote:
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" underpinnings. It
arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of
separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make

and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international relations.
The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expressed the strong sense of the

Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for
itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.2"

This statement serves as a justification not only for the act-of-state
doctrine, but for all those rules of judicial restraint designed to permit
free exercise of executive power in the field of foreign affairs. Implicit in
this justification was the Court's determination that the doctrine was one
of national, not state, common law:
[W] e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice
regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive
in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community
must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.25 '

The Supreme Court avoided the question of the validity of the
"Bernstein Exception" on the grounds that, whatever might have been
indicated by earlier executive statements in the case, the appearance of
the executive branch as amicus curiae in support of the application of the
act-of-state doctrine removed any doubt concerning executive policy.259
Bdit despite the Court's indication of possible doubt concerning the continued vitality of the "Bernstein Exception," the rationale upon which its
decision was based would clearly include the possibility of executive
waiver of the doctrine where this was politically useful. It is possible that
the Court had domestic, rather than foreign, political difficulties in mind
when it failed to endorse the "Bernstein Exception" per se. If this power
256.
257.
258.
259.

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,423 (1964).
Id. at 425.
Id. at 420.
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were explicitly recognized, executive refusal to permit adjudication of the
Cuban seizures could result in volatile public reaction against a branch
of the government whose personnel depend upon the electorate for their
positions. This last assumption is borne out by the struggle put up by the
executive branch against the legislative imposition of a "reverse
Bernstein" rule in the Hickenlooper Amendment.26
Congress, moved in part by a desire to advance the cause of
international law by requiring adjudications under it, and in far larger
rfieasure, by a desire to strike back at the Castro government, 6 , directed
courts in the United States to decide international legal violations in
property seizure cases without resort to the act-of-state doctrine.262 It
preserved the constitutionality of the legislation by providing that where
the executive expressly directs the court to apply the act-of-state
doctrine to the case at bar, the amendment is inapplicable. The shift put
the executive in the even less tenable domestic political position of being
forced positively to state, in effect, that foreign political considerations
require that the seized property be left with the Castro government rather
than be returned to its original American owner. More important,
however, this "saving clause" amounted to a direct legislative
recognition of executive power to determine the outcome of private
international cases where foreign political considerations were
paramount.
On remand to the district court, the Hickenlooper Amendment was
applied to the Sabbatino case itself.262 On appeal, the Second Circuit
spoke to the question of the relationship between executive, legislative,
and judicial power in the field of foreign affairs. The Court found no
unconstitutional interference by the legislature with the judicial power,
emphasizing that the legislative branch, as well as the executive, had
competence in foreign political matters.
As the Constitution did not require the exact result reached there [by the Supreme
Court] the Court must have exercised its discretion, based on its own judgment of
the situation, to choose among a number of constitutionally permissible alternative
rules as to the applicability of the act of state doctrine. Therefore, the political
260. See letter from George W. Ball, Acting Secretary of State, to Senator William
Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., in 1965 Hearings on the Foreign
Assistance Program Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 728-29
(1965).
261. See Senate Hearings, note 260 supra at 731-34, 750-52, 759-60; Hearingson the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1965 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 1060,
1304, 1315-16, 1318-19; Letter from Senator Hickenlooper to The Washington Post, July 27, 1964,
in 110 CONG. REC. 19546 (1964); Comment, supra note 24.
262. 78 Stat. 1013, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e)(2) (Supp. 111965-66).
263. BancoNacionaldeCubav. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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branches of our national government should be able to modify the Court's decision,
choosing another constitutionally permissible alternative (cases cited), especially as
the factor upon which the choice is based, the effect on our foreign relations, is
admittedly more within the competence of the politicalbranches of the Government

than the competence of the Court.26 '

The court's analysis of the question of legislative interference with
executive power again emphasized the parallel power of the legislature to
decide political questions in matters of foreign affairs. The court pointed
out that the Hickenlooper Amendment did not attempt to nullify
executive power to determine the outcome of act-of-state cases, but
only "reversed the presumptions" rised by failure of the executive to
speak, its will. Referring to recognition of broad executive powers in the
Curtiss-Wright case, the court wrote:
It is doubtful that the "plenary and exclusive" presidential power over foreign
affairs is this encompassing. . . . Even if one accepts for the purpose of argument
the view that the President holds all the residual power of the Government in the

field of foreign relations, it is clear that there is ample constitutional authority for
an assertion of congressional power. . . . Since Congress thus clearly possesses a
constitutional interest in the problem involved in this case, it was entitled to make its

will known by means of a statute.26'

Despite the court's emphasis upon legislative competence in foreign
political matters, the result of the Sabbatino litigation and the responsive
legislation is a victory for the executive branch. Judicial law-making by
common law techniques in act-of-state cases, and, by implication, in all
other cases closely touching the questions of international political
relations, is disapproved by the Supreme Court's opinion. Congressional
reaction did not deny but, in fact, specifically recognized the executive
branch as the final authority for determining private rights in these
cases whenever it desired to exercise its power. The executive, while
perhaps preferring a less politically hazardous means of achieving these
results, can live with the provisions of the legislation.
This consideration of federal executive law-making power might
well end with a restrained, but nonetheless important, caveat. Executive
law-making power is a necessary concommitant of the executive's
position as the international representative of this government. But such
law-making is and must be influenced by broader policy decisions than
those related to justice for private litigants in individual cases. Therefore,
abdication to executive law-making power by the legislature or the
judiciary should be done only with circumspection, based on the
recognition that each time the executive branch is given authoritative
264. 8anco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 181 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. aenied, 390
U.S. 957 (1968)(emphasis added).
265. Id. at 182.
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decision-making power in private cases, traditional concepts of the "just
result" are given secondary importance. The executive's job is a difficult
one in foreign affairs. He is under tremendous pressure to act, with his
eye and ear to all the political winds of the international scene. But
easing the executive's task is only one of the goals of foreign relations
law. The other two branches of government must be constantly aware
that even in the field of foreign affairs, this is a government of separated
powers and that executive law-making should be permitted only where
clearly necessary to enable the executive branch to play its role
effectively in international political matters.
D.

CONCLUSION

Writing in this field is like taking the picture of a fast-moving object
with a still camera. The blurred outlines indicate the speed of movement
and the temporary nature of conclusions. But some tentative conclusions
can be offered.
Identifying the authoritative sources of private international law in
our federal system requires a consideration of the varying roles assigned
to the law-making components of that system under our governmental
structure. We have sketched above the various sources of law which are
authoritative in private international law cases.
International law, decisive as it is in an international forum, is not
itself a controlling source in the municipal forum, though its rules,
together with the exigencies of international relations, do exert strong
influence upon the outcome of private international cases. Federal law is
the authoritative source of much private international law. The
Constitution, without dealing with these matters in detail, lays a broad
base of federal power in these matters. Treaties are increasingly
important as sources of law affecting private rights. Few federal statutes
are directed explicitly to this field, but the requirements of national
policy in the international arena are often relevant in determining the
applicability of federal statutes in private disputes involving an
international element. Federal common law developed by the courts to
implement federal policies has a substantial role. The law-making power
of the national executive has grown substantially in recent times in those
cases where national political determinations outweigh considerations of
private justice in private international cases.
Despite these indications of increasing federal law-making power,
the authoritative source for most of private international law is still state
law. It is state statutes and case reports which a lawyer or a judge
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consults as"a guide to his decisions. State courts have carried well the
burden of coordinating the private laws of the states with the laws of
other countries. By accepting this responsibility, they have helped to
make the international system work fairly and well.

This is as it should be. There is no conflict of interest between the
governments of the states and that of the nation in private international
cases. They have the common interest of providing effective resolution of
private international disputes within that system of divided labor which
our -onstitution prescribes, while preventing interference with the need
of the nation to function effectively in the international community. It is
therefore appropriate that the authority to make private international

law in the66 United States is shared by our government's political
2

divisions.

II.

THE FUNDAMENTAL SOURCES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

So far this article has limited itself to a question in our federal
nation which is inherent in all federal nations, the authoritative sources
of private international law. This limitation must not be allowed to
conceal another question about "sources" which is more basic and more
far reaching. What are the factors-ideals, policies, objectives,
practicalities-which guide a law-making body in laying down and
developing the principles of private international law? "Fundamental
sources" is the name given to these factors.2 67 In the remaking of conflict
of laws- now occurring the question is put insistently. For our present
purposes it is enough to state the question, to distinguish it from the one
to which the discussion is primarily directed, and to stress one factor too
easily ignored or under-valued in a world of uncritical national loyalties.
"[T]he needs of the interstate and international systems" is the first
factor relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law in the choice of
266. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall stated:
"The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all
the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally;
. . ." The passage from The Federalist. "If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to
be in respect to other nations," is the theme of the article Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations,
1965 DUKE L. J.248 (1965).
267. "Energizing Forces" is the term given them by Chief Justice Stone before he went on the
bench - "those energizing forces which are producing the technical doctrines of the law." Stone,
The Futureof Legal Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 234 (1924). If for the designation of sources there

were borrowed the terms from Aristotle's famous classification of-causes ("material," "formal,"
"efficient," "final"), "authoritative sources" would be "formal sources" and "fundamental
sources" would be "efficient sources". A brief statement of one writer's views on the several policies
in conflict of laws is given in Cheatham, Problems and Methods in Conflict of Laws, RECUEIL DES
CouRs, 242-52 (1960).
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law principles stated by The American Law Institute. 6 The basic nature
of the factor is recognized by distinguished authorities.
Judge Jessup before taking a seat on the International Court of
Justice wrote:
It would be the function of transnational law to reshuffle the cases and to deal out
jurisdiction in the manner most conducive
to the needs and conveniences of all
26
members of the international community. 9

Justice Jackson, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States in
a private international law case in admiralty, said:
It [maritime law] has the force of law, not from extraterritorial reach of national
laws, nor from Abdication of its sovereign powers by any nation, but from acceptance
by common consent of civilized communities
of rules designed to foster amicable
270
and workable commercial relations.

Professor Battifol has discussed two recent decisions of the highest
court of France which illustrate so well the primacy of the international
system policies that they deserve comment at some length.27 ' The cases
involved the validity of provisions for arbitration in contracts between
French government-owned enterprises and foreign private parties. Under
the Code of Civil Procedure of France an arbitration provision in a
contract of such an enterprise is ineffective. Nevertheless, the Cour de
Cassation upheld the validity of the provision in two international
contracts: in one case in which the foreign private party relied on it to
bar suit against it in a French court; in the other to enforce in a French
court a foreign award made pursuant to the arbitration provision. In
almost identical language the opinions in the cases put the question:
"whether the rule, enacted for internal contracts, should be applied as
well to international contracts made to suit the needs of, and under
conditions conforming to the usages of, maritime commerce; ... ."2,

The two cases agree that the rule of French internal law, here a provision
of internal public law, should not be applied in the conflict of law cases.
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, comment d at 16 (Proposed
Official Draft 1967).
269. P. JEssup, TRANSNATIONAL LAW'71 (1956). In the same spirit is the basic idea of an
earlier distinguished author: "Although thus no rule of international law and no postulate of comity
prevents a country from introducing whatever rule of private international law it may see fit, justice
demands that every country in making such rules should consider how they will affect social and
economic intercourse between any persons, be they its own nationals or aliens. . . . Private
International Law is not itself international, but it should certainly be drawn up in an international
frame of mind." WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 16 (2d ed. 1950).
270. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,581-82 (1952).
271. Batiffol, Arbitration Clauses Concluded Between French Government-Owned
Enterprisesand Foreign PrivateParties,7 COLIUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 32 (1968).
272. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
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Professor Battifol shows that the decisions can be justified as a matter of
French law because "[t]he nature of internation.l commerce justifies
special solutions to its problems" and "[tihe commercial and political
rationale for the decisions here under discussion is quite clear. ....-273
In this aspect the decisions are explained as based on French law,
modified to meet the needs of the situations which confront it. He
concludes his discussion with an intriguing comment:
The development of international commercial arbitration guarantees a special
efficacy to international commercial contracts conceived apart from internal
law. . . .Beyond the 'state,' contracts between private persons are creating a new
social system-that of international relations."'

The decisions by the Cour de Cassation involved only the validity
of arbitration procedures. Yet the ground and language of the decisions-"to suit the needs of, and under conditions conforming to the
usages of maritime commerce"-have wide application and give broad
support to decisions made "to suit the needs of" intfrnational
relations. 2" It is all the more so, because the cases put the needs of the
international system ahead of a specific provision restricting a
governmental agency, which has a much stronger claim to the protection
of local law than the ordinary litigant possesses.
There are threats to the wise consideration of this basic factor, the
needs of the international system. It may be of use to pull them out into
the open in order to see them for what they are. The threats here
mentioned are: the name given the subject, "conflict of laws"; the vague
and uncertain principles of sovereignty and public policy; the conception
of analytical jurisprudence employed in the adjustment of different laws;
and the absence.of specific guarantees in the Constitution.
One threat is the name ordinarily employed for the whole subject in
Anglo-American jurisprudence, "conflict of laws." This name carries
the impliciation that there is a combat between two nations or two
systems of law with each one doing what is usual in combat, pressing its
claims to the utmost. Both the name and the implication are misleading
and harmful. When a Frenchman brings an action against a German on
an occurrence with elements in both countries, the Frenchman may well
urge the use of German law because it is to his advantage, and German
may urge French law, and the court in either country may apply the
273. Id.at 35.
274. Id.at 45, 47.
275. The Supreme Court has used similar grounds and language in a torts case. Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1952). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6,
comment d at 16 (Proposed Official Draft 1967).
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other nation's law. There is no true "conflict" of the laws. A more descriptive and useful term for the subject is "coordination of legal institutions." To believe that it is to a nation's advantage every time its local
law is applied instead of the law of another nation is as erroneous and
unfair in law as the old mercantilist theory was in economics.
A second threat is uncritical use of the concept of sovereignty and
public policy. The fact of territorial sovereignty of nations does, indeed,
help create the problems of private international law. Certainly,
however, that fact by itself does not give the solution. The asserted
deduction of a particular solution from the fact or conception itself can
come only through first smuggling into it the answer desired. Another
solving phrase, "public policy" (ordre public), deserves a similar
comment: "Resort to the concept is beguilingly easy and does not
demand the hard thinking which the careful formulation of narrower,
more realistic, choice of law rules would require. The principal vice of
the public policy concepts is that they provide a substitute for
analysis."276
Another set of threats to the development of conflict of laws rules
comes from particular conceptions of analytical jurisprudence which are
urged by their supporters as the guides in the field. One set, concerning
the nature of the law involved, was the old distinction between matters
real and matters personal. That set of ideas has been discarded. Another
set, concerning the nature of legal interests of the parties, is still much
alive. This second set is dervied from our system of legal thought and
expression, complicated as it is by diverse legal systems. When a
complainant is entitled to recover, our accustomed form of thought and
expression is to say that the plaintiff has a legal right and the defendant
is under a legal duty. When an occurrence in one nation is sued on in
another and the plaintiff is allowed to recover, how do we explain that
the legal result under the laws in the state of occurrence is given effect in
the forum state, which has an entirely different legal system? At one time
emphasis was laid on the state and the time of the occurrence, and it was
said that the right created under that system of law was enforced in the
forum. This conception led to the excesses of the vested rights theory of
choice of law. Contrariwise, decisive emphasis has come to be placed on
the forum state where recovery is sought and given, and it is said that
only the law of that state is applicable and determinative. Neither of
these two sets of conceptions should control or affect the choice of law.
The fact is that the forum, under its conflict of laws rules, employs the
276. Paulsen & Sovern, "'PublicPolicy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLtIJI. L. REv. 969,
1016 (1956).
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local law of the foreign state, and only so much of that law as its guiding
policies in conflict of laws require."
There is yet another threat to the fair development of private
international law which is peculiar to our federal nation. It comes from
the fact that some provisions of the Constitution are applicable to
intranational, and not to international, conflict of laws. The full faith
and credit clause is the best illustration. The justification of a difference
in treatment by reference to such constitutional provisions overlooks the
decisive effect of the fundamental sources. The fundamental sources may
call for identity of treatment even though the authoritative sources are
different. Difference in the formal or authoritative source of expression,
whether in the Constitution or in state law, may be of no consequence
because of recognition of identity of result called for by the fundamental
sources of both kinds of conflict of laws. The rule of full faith and credit
to judgments between the states wduld be a wise rule even though not
embodied in the Constitution, and some state cases have based their
ciedit to sister state judgments on their own conflict of laws rules and not
on the Constitution.278 Similarly, in the international field the Uniform
Act on the Enforcement of Foreign Nations Judgments calls for the
protection of judgments of foreign nations under state law, even though
those judgments are, of course, not within the protection of the
Constitution itself. The American Law Institute makes the point explicit
by referring to the provisions of the Constitution which are controlling in
intranational conflict cases and stating that the same policies underlying
these constitutional provisions should ordinarily guide the formation of
the international conflicts rules. 9
In a consideration of the effect of these threats it may be useful to go
over a series of differences of increasing degree among nations and to
consider whether each difference in turn should affect the result. This
series will be discussed in an order of increasing degree of difference. The
first difference lies in the contrast between the ordinary international
case and an intranational case between the states of this nation. It has
been submitted and, it is hoped, demonstrated that the mere fact the case
is international in character should not, and under Amdrican law does
not, bring a difference in result.
277. See Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58
HARV. L. REV. 361, 376-77, 383-85 (1945).
278. In re Fischer's Estate, 118 N.J. Eq. 599 (1935).
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10, comment d at 49 (Proposed
Official Draft 1967Y. "A court in the United Stales, in any event, should.he guided by the policies of
fairness and equality embodied in these constitutional rules in deciding an international case to
which these rules are not strictly applicable."
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The second difference is not one between nations as contrasted with
States of the Union, but between different legal systems, as for example,
the civil law and the common law. Within our own nation there are
different legal systems; in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the
State of Louisiana the law is in large measure civil law, and many of the
Western States have a system of matrimonial property which originated
in the civil law. These differences in the legal systems within our nation,
though they may create gireater difficulties in the coordination of laws,
have never, so far as is known, been the ground for basically different
principles of conflict of laws; that is, for rejecting in choice of law the use
of the law of the state of greater interest or significant relationship. To
give an early illustration, the Supreme Court of Missouri, a state with
the system of separate marital property, protected the interest of a
Louisiana woman in Missouri land which had been bought by her
husband with the proceeds of Louisiana marital property."' There is a
similar recent case, the opinion in which was written by a judge most
conversant with conflict of laws.28 ' In international conflict of laws the
result is the same. In the Hilton case"' even the majority of the court,
who refused to enforce a French.judgment because of lack of reciprocity,
rejected as a ground of attack on the French judgment, the fact that the
procedural systems of the two nations differed. In the leading New York
case on the subject,283 a judgment of a court of Quebec was enforced,
though the Province is governed by civil law.
Differences in culture or social institution are a third reason which
may be urged for harsher treatment to interests under foreign law. Here
there is special need to keep in mind the admonition of Judge Cardozo
that we are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is
wrong because we deal with it differently at home.8 4 Differences in
culture or social institutions are themselves no reason for ignoring
foreign law and foreign institutions. An illustration of fairness and
wisdom in dealing with a foreign legal institution is given by a California
case mentioned earlier. 5 There a foreigner who died without a will left
surviving him two polygamous wives in his native country where
polygamy was lawful. Holding that the polygamous marriages would be
recognized in the distribution of the property in the state, the court
ordered equal distribution of the estate to the two wives.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Depas v. Mayo, II Mo. 314 (1848).
Traynor, C.J. in Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957).
See note 3 supra.
See note 10 supra.
Loucks v. Standard Oil of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
See note 17 supra.
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The last two kinds of differences discussed-differences in legal
systems and differences in social institutions-do give special
difficulties. Judges and lawyers are accustomed to think in the categories
and terms of their local laws. Foreign institutions do not fit so neatly
into categories and terms which enable lawyers and judges to deal fairly
with them. But this task is nothing new to conflict of laws. In ordinary
cases it is manifest that when conflict of laws borrows terms from local
law, it may have to give its own meanings to them. The terms,
"procedure" and "public policy", are illustrations which every lawyer
knows. In other parts of the law the developments of the natural sciences
are constantly creating new problems for which new categories and
solutions are required. The fair and wise coordination of the legal
institutions of the nations, now so close together, must not be hampered
by the failure of lawyers to develop ideas and categories and results
appropriate to the task. The old categories may be flexible enough to
deal wisely with problems unforseen when the categories were first
created, or new categories suitable to the novel problems may be
developed by the continuing creativity of the common law.
When we are brought face to face with legal relations unknown to our own law,

we may well find that we have no rules of conflict appropriate to these unknown
institutions. But we ought not therefore to refuse to recognize, or even in appropriate
circumstances to give effect to, an institution or status unknown in our Western
countries; rather, we should work out new rules applicable to the interplay of these
strange institutions with our own. International private law is not merely a.static
group of fixed rules confined to the legal institutions of a definite number of
Christian or Western States, but a dynamic entity which is constantly growing with
the pr6gressive integration of what is after all (and more obviously as time proceeds)
a single world." 6

The last difference among the nations is a most unfortunate one. It is a
difference in the fairness and dependability of the foreign laws or the
foreign actions. Cohflict of laws is not so blind as to treat hostile and
dishonest acts equally with the friendly and the honest. To treat unlike
things alike is itself unfair. When Hitler was accumulating foreign assets
to finance his imperialist plans, his decrees were denied effect in this
country.28 7 When foreign legal proceedings are conducted in a way which
is not consonant with fairness to the parties, the resultant judgments
should similarly be denied effect.
With the wise adjustment of public and private international
relations as the objective, the principles of private international law
286. Kollewijn. Conflicts of Western and Non- Western Law, 4 INT' L. 307,325 (1951).
287. Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co. v. Siemens &Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15 F. Supp.
927 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
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should be broad and flexible enough to deal with the enormous variety of
situations which confront it in an age when science and technology have
vastly increased the incidence and speed of international travel, but when
local loyalties and animosities have not declined with comparable speed,
if at all. It will take the best of vision and of will for men of law of each
nation to deal intelligently and fairly with foreign economic and social
institutions which are alien to their accustomed modes of thought and
which do not fit neatly into the categories of their local laws. No less
troubling are the differing political institutions which make and
administer the law. There comes to mind at once not only the differences
between the totalitarian and free enterprise nations, but also the
diversities among the free enterprise nations and among the communist
nations as well. Most troubling of all is the fact that the legal institutions
of some nations are not trusted by others. The tasks of private
international law in the years ahead will be increasingly important, as
well as increasingly difficult. The guide to their solution is faithful
attention to the fundamental source.28 S
288.

"The substantial provisions of international conflict of laws" are briefly considered in E.
E. GRISWOLD; NV. REESE, M. ROSENBERG, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 692.97
(5th ed. 1964).
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